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 Women’s struggle for equal rights in Post-Revolutionary Iran has left women to navigate 
between competing patriarchally prone identities, a secular pre-Islamic Persianness and a 
territorially bound Shi’a Islam. Because of Iran’s unique national identity, gender roles were 
dually affected. Representation of the male gender was normalized in both identities, stationing 
women into subordinate spaces populated by overlapping impositions on women’s equality. The 
necessity of women to carve out and occupy an elusive paradoxical space, for their voices to be 
heard, and which pursued modern women’s rights within the framework of Islamic ideological 
interpretation, left few terminal solutions. 
 The investigation of women’s voices illustrated how some Iranian women repositioned 
their resistance by working from within the chimeric spaces afforded them. Survival and 
persistence, liberal reinterpretation of Islamic texts, and building coalitions, allowed women to 
make inroads and stake claims, shrinking patriarchal controls. By occupying the implausible 
space between competing Iranian identities, women worked from within ideological coalitions, 
while inhabiting the margins of patriarchal prescriptions. While women’s efforts continue to be 
muted due to despotic state structures, chimeric spaces produce multi-generational, multi-
feminist, and multi-gendered productions of patriarchal anxiety. Utilizing a creative hybridized 
chimeric space which is in constant flux positions Iranian women to penetrate, neutralize, and 
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A variety of factors contributed to the social, political, and cultural consequences of the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979. As a result, Iranian women navigated a maze of ideological 
minefields while trying to establish public and private voices, leading to undulating battlefields 
upon which waves of Islamic oppression crashed only to be met with women’s resistance as 
they reoccupied those conquered spaces in an unending dance for control of their own bodies. 
Sex and gender expectations and regulations in post-revolutionary Iran and beyond have had a 
long historical framework. This paper explores the contemptuous dialog in Iranian women’s 
occupation of chimeric spaces.  The term chimeric has been used to describe the indeterminacy 
of categorization, the impossible creation of a nation state, and the problematic if not illusive 
resettlement of individuals.1 2 3 4In these senses a chimera was hoped for but in fact was illusory 
or impossible to achieve. I am using the term chimeric to construct a political space that I have 
termed “chimeric space.” Chimeric spaces were the locations between two hegemonic identities 
where Iranian women were able to modify and relaunch their hybridized resistances from the 
intersectional margins, always in flux. They appeared in the breaches, fissures, and cracks that 
women opened within the identities, a creative third space from which women were able to birth 
their resistances in a multitude of ways. Chimeric spaces were the political spaces claimed by 
 
1 Ignacio Klich, “The Chimera of Palestinian Resettlement in Argentina in the Early Aftermath of the First Arab-
Israeli War and Other Similarly Fantastic Notions,” The Americas, Vol. 53, No. 1 (July 1996): 15-43, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1007472. 
 
2 Benita Parry, “The Postcolonial: Conceptual Category or Chimera?” The Yearbook of English Studies, Vol. 27, 
The Politics of Postcolonial Criticism (1997): 3-21, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3509129. 
 
3 Julius Rowan Raper, “John Barth's "Chimera": Men and Women under the Myth,” The Southern Literary Journal, 





women within patriarchal constructions. These bastions were specifically gendered in ways that 
women were able to cause anxieties by commandeering agency from within this implausible 
space. By occupying these strongholds women were able to make their voices heard. 
These spaces appeared as the most unlikely places from which to deliver positive results, 
but they were strategically chosen by Iranian women to allow for the constant navigation of the 
various indeterminate intersections they were forced to confront. Progress was made by 
identifying and positioning their efforts between disparate purveyors of power such as modernity 
and Islamic morality, Persian nationalism and Islamic fundamentalist Shari’a law, and 
democracy and despotic imposition. These spaces were uniquely expressed in Iran and were the 
locations women chose to navigate and occupy through the process of discarding, reconstructing, 
and accepting cultural traditions and Islamic interpretations. These efforts regulated their 
fashion, practices, and bodies, while acknowledging the perceived inferior status of women’s 
voices in the public political sphere. The role of women in contemporary Iran is important and 
how they navigated the tightrope between participation and resistance, coupled with the ebb and 
flow of conservative state imposition, determined not only their access to social power, but 
promises to reveal the egalitarian future of Iran as a democracy.  
My goal is to illustrate how some Iranian women repositioned their resistance to 
patriarchal imposition by occupying battlefronts which worked from within the changing 
chimeric spaces afforded them by an evolving political landscape. Iranian women’s various 
methods of resistance allowed them to make inroads and stake claims which built on their 
expanding intrusion of patriarchal control. Over time, women have deftly pivoted to find the 
 
4 Other examples of “negotiated positionality,” “in-between or hybrid positions,” and “complex cultural and political 
borders on the cusp of political spheres,” can be found in the postcolonial critiques of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 




middle ground of whatever framework defined the political spaces, public and private, from 
which their resistance could be issued. They have made patriarchal bargains at times to survive 
to fight another day. They have pressured state systems to loosen control of women’s bodies. 
They carved out spaces for their voices to be heard concerning women’s issues like 
contraception, abortion, forbidden and mandatory veiling, and other issues involved with the 
maintenance of the valuation of virginity. Using various active and passive techniques, women 
were able to create and maintain space over time through unrelenting efforts, no matter how big 
or small they seemed, by knowing when and how hard to apply pressure. By seeking these 
chimeric spaces Iranian women were able to build coalitions and avoid the polarization which 
would intensify oppositional attacks.  
Women implemented these gendered forms of resistance within a framework where the 
state mitigated the occupation of modern power, in spaces that were neither traditionally Iranian 
nor solely Islamic or, truly democratic nor unquestioningly despotic. By constantly being willing 
to redefine the foundational space from which their resistance could be launched, women 
continued to shift the patriarchal continuum in a more egalitarian direction. At times, women’s 
resistance was active but often, it was passive. Women worked to challenge impositions in both 
obvious and subtle ways. Iranian women understood how to navigate the traditional and religious 
dictates governing their lives. More importantly, they knew when the best outcome for women’s 
resistance was to merely survive, to fight another day. This method of survival and persistence 
played a key role in their successes. By occupying the chimeric space which resided between 
competing Iranian identities, women were able to resist from within ideological groups, while 
inhabiting the margins of patriarchal prescriptions, allowing them to slowly create breaches in a 




WHAT IS RESISTANCE? 
Resistance is how subordinate groups penetrate, neutralize, and negate the hegemony of 
superordinate groups. Some methods of resistance include the commandeering of symbolic tools, 
demystifying prevailing ideology, and resisting “close to the ground,” remembering that their 
efforts should remain rooted in the realities of everyday life.5 Various groups of women in Iran 
have resisted in numerous ways to the impositions of patriarchal controls. Over time, those who 
opposed the restrictions, like other subordinate resistance groups, determined methods which 
were the most effective for them, in those times and in those places. There was little resemblance 
to the formal organized political activity of large homogenous groups helmed by identifiable 
leadership. Instead, women’s resistance in Iran often appeared to have little or no coordination or 
planning, consisted of constant struggles for their own individual interests, stopped short of 
outright collective defiance, and make use of implicit understandings and informal networks.6 
Women used ordinary daily activities as munitions to battle societal, religious, and political 
impositions, employing everyday forms of resistance. Most often, protesting subordinate groups 
were crushed. Everyday forms of resistance were more effective over the long run and provided 
women with plausible deniability of any kind of coordinated membership which could provoke a 
more ferocious response. Unlike large-scale protest movements which only posed a momentary 
threat, everyday forms of resistance made no headlines.7   
 By engaging in these seemingly minor resistances, women in Iran were able to target 
multiple vectors of imposition in different arenas. While the women who participated did not 
 
5 James C. Scott. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. (New Haven: Yale Press 
University, 1985), 338. 
 
6 Ibid., 23. 
 




always succeed at reaching their desired goals, the confrontations forced reactions to be selected 
from a narrowed pool of responses. “Policies may be recast in line with more realistic 
expectations. They may be retained but reinforced with positive incentives aimed at encouraging 
voluntary compliance. And, of course, the state may simply choose to employ more coercion.”8 
Either way, women’s safety resided in their ability to remain anonymous, whether they were 
resisting social, political, or religious impositions in public or private spaces. 
 Whether in the public political space or in the domestic arena, women employing these 
forms of resistance did so because these were the methods which enabled women to start carving 
out spaces for their voices to be heard. They worked from the spaces available within the 
constraints of the institutions of repression which precluded forms other than, “the individual, the 
informal, and the clandestine.”9 These forms worked within the framework of systems of 
domination often appearing complicit or accommodating. In truth, by perpetuating a system of 
survival and persistence, women were able to stake claims, shifting the continuum of egalitarian 
issues, with lessened confrontations from authoritarian forces, due in part to the disinclination of 
superordinate groups to expose the “tenuousness of their authority.”10 While carving out a 
location for discourses located in the chimeric spaces, women revealed their intention to resist 
through a system of survival and persistence, developing coalitions to work from within 
ideological groups, while inhabiting the margins of patriarchal prescriptions. Like other 
subordinate groups, women in Iran were, in the words of Eric Hobsbawm, “working the 
 
 
8 Ibid., 36.   
 
9 Ibid., 299. 
 





system…to their minimum disadvantage.”11 
IRANIAN IDENTITY AND ITS ROLE IN THE CREATION OF CHIMERIC SPACE 
Iranian identity has never been fully coherent. There has been a constant juxtaposition 
between a pre-Islamic glorification of Persianness, and a territorially bound membership in 
Shi’a Islam.12 Women in Iran navigated in the space between these two identities, as they both 
contributed to the patriarchal impositions on women’s rights. Normally, nationalist identity 
was not based on religious membership, especially because, according to Reza Davari, 
nationalism was a phenomenon based on a social construct among individuals independent of 
any other entity, including God, and was therefore, by its nature secular and liberal. 13 Iran 
occupied a unique space in the nationalism process.  
Iranian political battlefronts witnessed shifts from Islamic monarchies rooted in 
Islamic traditions, to secular constitutional monarchies which glorified Persian identity, 
during the late 19th Century to the early 20th Century. During the Pahlavi dynasty modernity 
was pursued relegating Islamic law to a subaltern position in the political discourse. The 
Islamic Revolution of 1979 instituted a democratic Islamic state structure based on the Shari’a 
law, vilifying secular discourses. Through it all, women’s issues were used as tools to gain 
popular support, develop state legitimacy, and illustrate to a modern world, the progress Iran 
was making, leaving their “backwardness” behind.  
The majority of Iran practiced Shi’a Islam. Membership in the modern world 
necessitated a move toward Western ideals and the embrace of their Persian (Aryan) heritage 
 
11 Eric Hobsbawm, “Peasants and Politics,” Journal of Peasant Studies 1, no. 1 (1973): 7. 
 
12 Alam Saleh and James Worrall, “Between Darius and Khomeini: exploring Iran’s national identity 
problematique,” National Identities 17, no. 1, (2015): 74, DOI: 10.1080/14608944.2014.930426. 
 




which like Shi’a Islam, set Iran apart from the rest of the Middle Eastern nations, which 
practiced Sunni Islam and were majority Arab. Thus, in Iran, there was never a way to 
separate the two identities. Nor was there a way to combine them because of the conflict 
between modern Enlightenment ideals and the limitations of legitimate interpretation of the 
Islamic texts within the Islamic Republic of Iran’s state structure which insisted on strict 
conservative readings of their holy texts. Women’s persistent battles for space were similar in 
that they took place, first between modernity and Islamic morality, then in the space created by 
the duality of Persian nationalism and the Shari’a law, and ultimately, within the interval formed 
by democratic polity and the authoritarian imposition of a conservative interpretation of Islamic 
texts. In each situation, women had to create space between two titanic identities which rarely 

















MULTIPLE VECTORS OF PATRIARCHAL INTERSECTION 
 
CONSTRUCTING SPACES FOR WOMEN 
The subordination of women according to patriarchal structures was not a new 
development at the turn of the 20th Century. Divine sanction of male guardianship predated 
Islam.14 “The message of Islam…comprehended two tendencies that were in tension with each 
other. Patriarchal marriage and male dominance were basic components of the institution of 
marriage as established by Muhammed…and yet Islam preached an ethical egalitarianism as a 
fundamental part of its broader spiritual message.”15 Some sects gave primacy to the ethical 
component of the Islamic message and other more orthodox sects focused on the fundamentals of 
the texts using the law to bind these ideals to its followers. This helped to establish pre-Islamic 
traditions by codifying the practices into the lives of Muslims through Shari’a.16 In this way, as 
with other religions, orthodox Islam became a vehicle for the multiple vectors of patriarchy 
which existed in societal, cultural, and political realms. Muhammad’s marriage to Khadija Al-
Kubra was not patriarchal in the usual sense. She was previously married and widowed twice, 
before marrying Muhammad. She had a large trade caravan that eclipsed many owned by men in 
the region. She had her own servants and refused many other suitors before she pursued 
Muhammad’s hand in marriage. He was poor but agreed to her proposal although, and perhaps 
because, she had the means to support herself. They were monogamously married for twenty-
five years, entering the marriage with children from previous marriages. 
 
14 Camron Michael Amin. The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman: Gender, State Policy, and Popular Culture, 
1865-1946. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), 18.   
 
15 Leila Ahmed, “Early Islam and the Position of Women: The Problem of Interpretation,” in Women in Middle 
Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender, edited by Beth Baron and Nikki R. Keddie (New Haven: 




 Much has been blamed on the Hadith that were put into practice based on Muhammad’s 
life, but it was only after Khadija Al-Kubra died that he started living in polygamous marriage 
arrangements. Orthodox Islam, in instituting specific practices into their legal code have 
illustrated the tensions between competing interpretations of the Quran and the Hadith and 
misconceptions which superimposed the start of Islam and the establishment of these traditional 
patriarchal customs. Women’s roles and practices including seclusion, genital mutilation, 
subordination to men, and donning the veil were incorrectly attributed to Islam. “A closer 
examination of the historical evidence, however, reveals that the practices in question pre-date 
Islam by many centuries.”17  
 As Islam spread out of Arabia, it was adopted by people who were either unfamiliar with 
traditional Arabian customs, and were thus unable to correctly attribute them, or they also 
practiced the same cultural traditions and simply incorporated the customs wholesale. Thorkild 
Jacobsen has noted, “the mythmakers could not have ‘depicted a society quite outside their 
experience and unrelated to anything they or their listeners knew.”18 Each region interpreted and 
incorporated these laws into their established code which took shape in diverse forms across the 
Islamic world, assisting in the deterioration of women’s positions.  
 Shi’a Islam was introduced to the lands of Iran as a state religion by the Safavid Empire. 
It entrenched patriarchal customs into societal practices through orthodox interpretations 
establishing them as male Koranic duty. Mohammad Baquer Majlesi, a 17th century Islamic jurist 
illustrated this by stating, “A woman’s value lays in her ability to produce children and to please 
 
16 Ibid., 58. 
17 Guity Nashat, “Women in the Middle East 8,000 B.C.E – C.E. 1800,” in Women in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Restoring Women to History, edited by Guity Nashat and Judith E. Tucker (Bloomington & Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1999), 5. 




her husband. Her inherent lack of honor and intelligence required the man responsible for her to 
shield her from strange men, from suggestive parts of the Koran, and even from her own sexual 
desires. (via circumcision)”19 
 Following the fall of the Safavids and a short feuding period the successors of the state 
were the Qajars. The Qajar Empire championed the traditional orthodox legacy of the Safavid 
Empire. They were met with dissidents who wanted change. They were called the renewalists. 
By advocating for more modernity at the end of the 19th century, the renewalists were 
inadvertently challenging Safavid traditions, which were rooted in pre-Islamic patriarchal 
systems. The renewal movement adopted the plight of women early on looking to return to 
sensibilities which predated Safavid rule and the imposition of orthodox Shi’a Islam 
interpretations.20 They viewed the “traditionalist” Iranian woman as someone who was trapped 
by tyranny and superstition. She was the poorest of women and a burden to her husband. 
 During this period, Iranian intellectuals focused on modern Enlightenment ideals, 
bringing attention to what they thought of as a corrupted moral environment which was infecting 
Iranian women. Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani saw them, “as he did all of Iranian society—as 
victims of a social and political environment that deprived them of their natural and, implicitly, 
virtuous national attributes.”21 He identified conventions attributable to Twelver Shi’ism, such as 
the practice of temporary marriages, as exacerbators to the problem of polygyny which he 
identified as a barbaric Arabic custom. The writings of intellectuals like Mirza Fath-Ali 
Akhundzadeh and Kermani helped renewalists promote modernization bringing the plight of 
 
 
19 Amin, The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman, 18. 
 
20 Ibid., 23. 
 




women into public discourses. These would contribute to the Constitutional Revolution, which 
saw the creation of the Constitution of 1906, the establishment of the Parliament, and the re-
institution of both in 1909 after a brief period during which they had been abolished. 
 The reinstitution of the Constitution in 1909 helped to open the way for fundamental 
change touting thoughts of modernity, which were influenced by Western ideals such as 
democracy, justice, equality and independence. “The movement created a conceptual link 
between national independence and progress and women’s emancipation. It constructed women 
as social actors for the first time and facilitated the formation of a network of women’s rights 
activists which gradually developed into a loosely formed women’s movement.”22 The 
movement sought to improve women’s positions by demanding education and changes to the 
policies of seclusion and early marriage. The creation of the measures during the push for 
modernity inevitably tied feminist ideals to national development.  
Islam, of course, was ever present. The ulama, or Muslim scholars, debated feminist 
challenges, pointing out the secular discourse associated with the push for modernity where 
Islam was relegated to a traditionalist backward practice. The more orthodox Muslim clergy 
fought against the removal of the veil and the building of schools for women. Although some 
supported the Constitution and allowed their daughters to attend the schools, others incited mobs 
to attack them.23 Feminism in Iran going forward would, in part, be constructed within the 
framework of competing Islamic interpretations. 
  The role of women in Iranian society was well established by December 1925, the year 
 
 
22 Parvin Paidar, “Feminism and Islam in Iran,” in Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives, edited by 
Deniz Kandiyoti (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 52. 
 





Reza Pahlavi was appointed as the legal monarch, the Shah, by the Iranian Assembly. People 
were weary of the impotence of the previous constitutional government which was influenced by 
European powers via threats and interventions. The Constitution had eliminated the authority of 
the Crown, but the coup and subsequent power grab reinvigorated the dictatorial position. Reza 
Shah established a strong central state, centered around a strong military, with an affinity toward 
intellectual modernism. His approach, “ended an era of women’s independent activities by 
creating a state-sponsored women’s organization to lead the way on women’s emancipation.”24 
He co-opted the previous women’s movements by delivering many of the initiatives that 
feminists sought, including compulsory unveiling, free education and job opportunities and 
establishing a state-led organization, in its place. Women’s voices were silenced as the various 
groups of women, including independent socialists, liberal nationalists, and feminists, were 
muted by the only voice speaking on behalf of their rights, the state.25 
 Reza Shah’s regime wanted to address the woman question to establish political 
legitimacy because it would illustrate their success in a political arena where the Qajar had 
failed. His establishment of the Women’s Awakening project in 1936 sought to offer new 
opportunities for some women to get an education and access to positions in the workforce, in 
exchange for the unveiling of all Iranian women in public, part of what he thought was necessary 
for the creation of a modern state.26 His vision included a future where women were no longer 
just domestic counterparts for men, but where women acted as colleagues in public spaces, 
 
24 Ibid., 54. 
 
25 Paidar, “Feminism and Islam in Iran,” 55. 
 





“chaperoned by her male guardian.”27  
In Iran, Reza Shah’s vision for women was announced to a group of teachers and female 
students on January 8th, 1936, also known as “the day of shame.” He stated that women would 
now be free to enjoy other advantages of society, in addition to the task of motherhood. The 
Shah had abolished the veil. “Women were urged to go to universities, become teachers, join the 
expanding ministries, that is to participate in the building of a newly forming state bureaucracy, 
rather than become part of the labour force in factories.”28 However, while the Shah was opened 
schools for girls and encouraged higher education for women, all independent women’s societies 
and journals were closed.  
 The veil was a central component to Reza Shah’s program and later, thanks to their 
seizure of political discourse, to the Islamic State. Reza Shah believed banning the veil was an 
example of modernization from above. He saw the practice of veiling as a backwardness that 
was holding back Iran in the world. By tying women’s issues to the legitimacy of the state, 
hoping to build its power, Reza Shah confirmed the traditions of patriarchy with the assertion 
that male guardianship was necessary for women’s arrival into the public political space. He 
attempted to use women’s issues as a tool to break civil law away from Shari’a law, so that 
Iran could have an opportunity to join the modern world. Ultimately, the coopting of the 
women’s movement and the fact that the project only helped a small number of women while 
alienating others, leading to backlash from some, marked the effort as a failure. 29  




28 Afsaneh Najmabadi, “Hazards of Modernity and Morality: Women, State and Ideology in Contemporary Iran,” in 
Women, Islam & the State, edited by Deniz Kandiyoti (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 54. 
 




religious values and made women the target of attacks from religious zealots. The Shah 
maintained that he was freeing women by forcing them to remove the veil. The Women’s 
Awakening project of 1936 succeeded in introducing women’s gender equality issues into 
political discourse. Previously, women’s issues focused mainly on equity in private spaces, 
but unveiling and offering women opportunities for education and placement in the workforce 
opened dialogue about women’s equality in public spaces.30 
Reza Shah suppressed political opposition and tied his movement to the liberal model of 
Western society. He sought to secularize government and avoided overt criticism of Islam to 
quell the opposition. The push for secular nationalism was helped by the rise of socialism across 
the border in the Soviet Union. The uniformity of the newly formed conscripted military unified 
the previous grouping of ragtag tribes and groups. Similarly, he hoped to refashion the nation as 
one Iranian body politic, where the “citizen-soldiers were the instruments of reconstruction, for 
which he was its mind.”31  
The son of Reza Shah took over the throne in 1941. Mohammad Reza Shah continued to 
pursue the same policies as his father. These early years provided women with more access to 
education and introduced them to political activism. Ten years into his rule there was a short 
lived liberal nationalist government which took over temporarily and would prove to be very 
influential in creating feminist space for women in the future, but certainly not in the ways that 
the West would have intended. A coup led by the British and the Central Intelligence Agency of 
the United States restored the Shah to the throne in 1953.  
Iranian intellectuals theorized that women should shun the veil, but, “not enter the 
 
 





public sphere on politics, the judiciary, or the civil service.”32 They attacked superstition and 
irrationality, as well as, poetry, saying it contributed to an avoidance of thought. They set up 
boundaries to women’s rights, stating that women could, “participate through their political 
support of national and necessarily male agendas.”33 They sought a modernity, devoid of 
capitalist commodification that worked through a framework of Islamic teachings and ideals. 
As they joined other marginalized groups, they condemned the monarchy for being modern 
but not democratic, authoritarian but not within the confines of Islamic law, but also for 
promoting “westoxicated” images of women, instead of “authenticating a secular concept of 
womanhood.”34 Like Reza Shah, the opposition learned to co-opt ideas, even if 
fundamentally, they seemed at odds with the application of putting those ideological ideals 
into practice in reality. 
Women were permitted to seek employment in state bureaucracy and some public arenas 
were open to women’s participation. The expansion of participation for women grew to include 
elements of social, economic, and educational life, but the reforms were mostly cosmetic. The 
economic and social changes worked to intensify women’s oppression. Women were expected to 
be modern-yet-modest. There was a concern over the moral corruption of women and the 
commoditization of women’s sexuality, a perpetual trope which continued to be echoed by 
religious leaders in Iran. 
 
31 Najmabadi, “Hazards of Modernity and Morality,” 53. 
 
32 Zohreh T. Sullivan, “Eluding the Feminist, Overthrowing the Modern? Transformations in Twentieth-Century 
Iran,” in Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East, edited by Lila Abu-Lughod (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 222. 
 
33 Ibid., 222. 
 





Major shifts occurred during the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. Mohammad Reza Shah 
positioned himself as a despotic leader who was the “Great Benefactor” of his people, instead of 
a monarch who worked with citizens to build up the state.35 Secular political organizations fell 
by the wayside and the Islamic clergy emerged as a political force. Important Muslim 
intellectuals shifted the views on women. “With the demise of secular politics, discourses on 
women within opposition politics became progressively moralized, and eventually 
Islamicised.”36 “Instead, women were urged to embrace the new Shi’i model of womanhood 
which represented ‘authenticity’ and ‘independence’ and emphasized women’s dual role as 
mothers and revolutionaries.”37 Any progress of women’s rights became gifts from the Shah, 
adding to the glory of the state.  
Islamist feminism, or gender activism constructed within an Islamic framework, joined 
other feminist groups to work for women’s equality. “Iranian feminism was essentially secular 
until the rise of Shi’i modernism in the 1970s.”38 The work of the Women’s Organization of Iran 
was not permitted to claim responsibility for any progress. Instead, any reforms were due to the 
benevolence of the Shah. The state system became the most important obstacle to success for 
women during this period. This left women to position themselves in the chimeric space between 
the efforts of the Shah’s progressive modernity and Islamic morality.39  
In 1967, Iran opened a network of family planning clinics with the intention of 
 
35 Najmabadi, “Hazards of Modernity and Morality,” 59. 
 
36 Ibid., 60. 
 




39 Homa Hoodfar, “Devices and Desires: Population Policy and Gender Roles in the Islamic Republic,” Middle East 





controlling and reducing the population growth rate. Abortion was legalized in 1973, with the 
permission of the husband, during the first trimester. Contraceptives were made available 
including surgical procedures such as tubal ligations and vasectomies. There was high demand 
for these benefits in highly populated urban areas where middle class families lived, however, 
“there was little effort to extend family planning to the rural population, though nationally an 
estimated 11 percent of women of child-bearing age used some form of contraceptive.”40 
Some efforts to enforce women’s literacy and education lead to contradictions of 
progress.  In a telling example, centers were set up to train rural village girls to become agents of 
development. Rural areas had clung more fiercely to their Islamic customs. They found it 
culturally shocking trying to acclimate to western culture. When the girls slept in bunk beds, in 
their dorms, they would fall out of them. So, in an effort to help them, they were tied to their 
bunks by their veils, “bound to her bed with the veil in the larger cause of progressive rights and 
freedoms, a paradox of modernity, captures the simultaneity of modernity and its underside of 
the forces of reason and their bondage, of the necessary reconstruction of identity and the loss of 
community; it bears witness to modernity as its own grave digger.”41 While this example may 
not have been typical, it provided fodder for those who opposed Western ideals.  This type of 
modernity did not offer freedom from the perspective of Islamic adherents. It acted as a forced 
Imperial bondage as it attempted to provide access to a wider variety of freedoms. 
These efforts of modernization also produced other unintended consequences. The very 
presence of these modern women in the rural villages, the cornerstone of orthodox Islamic 








would come knocking at the door, only to ask for the women in the home, instead of asking to 
speak to the ‘man of the house.’ The Mohammad Reza Shah’s programs of “modernization, 
rapid industrialization, and westernization” resulted in poverty and chaos as people moved from 
rural to urban areas. Unfortunately, reactionary violence against rural women continued to be a 
consequence of modernity, hereafter. While modernity was able to codify people’s public lives, 
familial law, especially within the confines of the home, remained Islamic.42 
WOMEN’S VOICES DURING THE TRANSITION 1967-1979 
In 2008, Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani interviewed Mahnaz Afkhami about the years 
surrounding the Revolution and her work with the women’s movement during those years. Ms. 
Afkhami was appointed, Minister for Women’s Affairs in 1976 and served as the Secretary 
General of the Women’s Organization of Iran (WOI) from 1970 until 1978. During the interview 
she said, Iranian laws were rooted in patriarchal ideas sustaining traditional roles of men and 
women within the family. The man was the leader who owned his women and children. Because 
of this, the WOI sought to reform the laws in pursuit of the rights of women. The group worked 
with the Majles, Iran’s Parliament, to create laws which would enhance the interests of women in 
the family. Ultimately, the Family Protection Laws of 1967 and the revision of 1975 established 
more equality pertaining to issues like minimum marriage ages, divorce, child custody, child 
support payments, polygamy, and temporary marriages, among other rights. Afkhami conveyed 
the words of Ms. Mehrangiz Dowlatshahi, a member of the Iranian Parliament during the 
discussions which led to the 1967 law which illustrated the persistent efforts made by women to 
fight for their own rights. “She said it took three years of sustained activity and lobbying, 
including study, research, and exchange of ideas and debate with legal experts, judges, and 
 




female and male attorneys to prepare the draft and have it submitted to the Majles by 15 deputies 
as the rules required.”43 Even with this kind of preparation, the bill initially met opposition from 
those concerned about any conflict with familial Islamic law, but after consulting with legal 
experts and progressive members of the clergy, through an arduous process, the bill was passed. 
This kind of extraordinary effort, whether big or small, public or private, overt or inconspicuous, 
came to typify the determination required by women to carve out spaces for their voices to be 
heard. 
The Family Protection Acts of 1967 and 1975 were landmark moments for women’s 
rights in Iran. The monarchy issued the ultimately short-lived efforts, more concerned with 
impressing and seeking membership in a modern world, than by responding to the needs of 
women; however, their successes were important milestones. They further established women as 
political actors. Special courts were set up for family matters. This established a precedent for 
the Special Civil Courts which would handle family law, after the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic. The Acts moved family matters in the lives of women in a more progressive direction 
in the areas of marriage, divorce, and child custody. The minimum age for women to be married 
was raised from 9 to 15 in 1967 and then to 18 in 1975. The Acts also outlined specific 
circumstances when women would be granted divorces. Before their institution, only men had 
the ability to seek divorces. Circumstances included incurable diseases, addiction, impotence or 
infertility, mistreatment (with witness testimony), and the inability of the husband to provide for 
his wife. Mothers were able to gain custody of the children after a divorce if the courts 
determined that it was best for the children. The Acts also established that in either case, the 
father would be responsible for the financial maintenance of the child. The 1975 Act also 
 




restricted the number of polygamous marriages a man could seek to one and only with 
permission from the courts and the consent of the first wife. Also, wives were granted the right to 
a divorce, should the husband obtain a second wife.44  
Afkhami continued to reveal other obstacles to the passing of the bill. While it was being 
debated, another women’s reforms bill sponsored by a female Senator got leaked to the 
newspapers. It was a more progressive bill which created a frenzy in the press. It focused on the 
most sensational aspects of the alternate bill, igniting widespread debate across the country. 
Ultimately, it forced some of the aspects out of the WOI sponsored bill to be tabled. “Some of 
the members of the clergy even spoke of denouncing Senator Manouchehrian as a heretic 
causing her to leave Tehran until the publicity, and the possible threat to her safety, subsided.”45 
Polygamy and child custody reforms were postponed for 8 years as a result of the uproar. Not 
only were women’s efforts targeted by those who sought to keep the patriarchal agenda intact, 
but so were their physical bodies, as well as their immortal souls. 
Afkhami followed up her own thoughts by wondering, “Whether it is useful to attempt 
reforms that have a good chance to succeed and thus to improve women’s lives as much as 
possible or is it preferable to wait until the ideal becomes realizable?”46 Answering her own 
question she posited, every society has a variation of groups with wide-ranging sets of thought 
and beliefs. The way forward for women’s issues was to be succinct with the issue, disperse the 
knowledge broadly, engage large swaths of people and encourage them to persistently participate 
in the political exchanges, so long as they stayed on message. She recognized that the vehement 
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opposition from the conservative clerics was only due in part to their religious concerns. Instead 
she believed their continued involvement in familial matters yielded influence and substantive 
benefits. 
The work of the WOI in the 1970’s made them targets. Any efforts made to advance the 
betterment of women’s lives was met with hostility as opponents enjoined their work with the 
Shah’s modernity agenda. Women’s reforms became a symbol of the Shah’s counterfeit Iranian 
image. Still, women had a lot of encouraging results. “The services offered at the WOI’s Welfare 
Centers served as a good vehicle for mobilizing large numbers of women, because it legitimized 
their leaving their homes and participating in group activities, which had a tangible impact on the 
lives of families.”47 They increased women’s awareness of legal issues and were the first Middle 
Eastern organization to research how to eliminate honor killings, creating a model for reforming 
laws which would be used in other countries. They developed a World Plan of Action which was 
ratified during the United Nations’ First International Conference on Women in Mexico, in 1975. 
And, they learned from their mistakes. Afkhami recounted a blunder which led to the resignation 
of Senator Manouchehrian. During their work on the passport law, which strove to change the 
requirement for women traveling abroad to have to seek the permission of their husbands first, 
Afkhami wrote an open letter to the President of the Senate, expressing her opposition. It was 
printed on the front page of the newspapers, marring their efforts to change the law. It was an 
important lesson to learn in the fight for women’s rights. Consequently, when they, “decided to 
disseminate the news of legalization of abortion – which made abortion legal by eliminating 







memos disseminated by the Ministry of Health and the WOI.”48 
Some conservative Iranians felt, especially those opposed to the Shah, modernity was 
being forced down their throats without regard to the texts guiding their lives. The WOI 
continued their efforts organizing women’s events and studies which sought to reform gender 
bias, prejudicial images and the role of women in film, media, and textbooks. But, Afkhami 
revealed that their efforts resulted in a populace that did not know how to communicate their 
stances with each other. “We created conditions in which the contradictions related to modernity, 
progress, equality, and human rights, especially women’s rights, increased and the reaction to 
our work put perhaps too much pressure on the country’s social fabric.”49 
Iranians began to feel that the Shah was only serving his own best interests. Movements 
to reclaim Iranian heritage and culture sprang up across the country. The protesters, spurred on 
by Islamic voices, rejected Western capitalist influences. To meet and converse in private, away 
from the prying eyes of the Shah’s secret police, many sought the safety of mosques. “Numerous 
women involved in this movement began to don hejab in an effort to reclaim their Iranian and 
Islamic heritage by covering their bodies to hide them from the outside gaze.”50  
They created a movement which continued to pursue modernity, but not one based on the 
Western capitalist model. They aligned with the marginalized under the Shah’s regime and were 
thus influenced by Islamic voices. This led to the pursuit of a modernity which worked within 
the Islamic framework. Coupled with the 1936 decree banning the veil, it seemed as if the 
Iranian people were living under an oppressive regime who hypocritically promoted progress and 
freedom but did not allow people to choose.  
 






One of the other women who came to work with Afkhami was Australian Elizabeth Reid. 
In 1988, the Foundation for Iranian Studies conducted interviews, so it was at this time that Ms. 
Afkhami had the opportunity to interview Ms. Reid about her work for women’s rights in Iran 
during the pre-Revolution years. Reid recounted how during the 1978 anniversary of lifting the 
veil she attended a ceremony where she was a guest speaker. The event took place only days 
after the Ayatollahs issued a directive forbidding Iranian women from appearing on stage 
without a veil. Ms. Reid saw women who lived their entire lives without a veil, don one for the 
event. She witnessed first-hand, the beginning of the religious attacks on women. She attributes 
the exertion of brutal force to the need for religious people to halt the progress of women rights 
in society. It was this event which marked the start of the revolution for her.51 
In the previous years, Reid noted, women started to demand their rights which proved to 
be too much when coupled with the other changes happening in Iran, the rural migration to the 
cities, the soaring price of food, inadequate services, and the fees associated with education and 
hospital services. According to Reid, complaints about these changes from the religious ulama 
forced the revolution to happen. It began with legitimate complaints aired in the Mosques, where 
anger and discontent would get “whipped up” and directed at the Shah.52 Additionally, women 
were moving out of rural areas, leaving rural men with fewer options, resulting in discontent. 
Reid stated, “We were in the southern most UN project and the most vulnerable because we were 
all women, we’d been directly associated with the Shah’s family, with Ashraf, while we were in 
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the Women’s Organization.”53 The aggression against women, fueled by their recent progress 
and the disruption of traditional patriarchal life, confronted Reid in September of that year. 
Reid lived in a house with another Australian diplomat. One day people started to gather 
around their back gate, while she was alone in the house. They directed her to put on her chador 
and come down to speak with them in the street. Reid described what happened next as a 
“kangaroo court.” Accused of being prostitutes because the previous night some male friends had 
come over for a meal and danced to music after dinner in their own home. As the accusations 
intensified, men began to surround her. She feared for her life as they yelled at her in Farsi. 
“They got nastier and nastier and eventually they said if I didn’t either convert to Islam and come 
with them to the Mosque five times a day, or leave the country by Moharram I would be 
murdered, I would be dead.”54 Eventually, as the women who were chanting at the back of the 
group fixed her chador, because she was wearing it incorrectly, she managed to move them 
toward her back gate, so that she could re-enter her house. She continued to live in fear until the 
UN finally pulled out of the country, which was delayed due to the UN not wanting to send a 
message of no confidence in the Shah. Before leaving, Reid saw women who previously were 
living independently and reading poetry, revert to wearing the veil. An informal project was 
started to discuss with these women what was behind the conversion. Reid told Afkhami in the 
interview, “Every one of those women reported that she’d had a dream and in that dream she had 
been told to revert to the veil.”55 The only variation was whether the women had been visited by 
Khomeini or Allah. This seemed to mark the beginning of the efforts by women during the 








create spaces in the future. 
Looking back at the aftermath of the Revolution, Mahnaz Afkhami retrospectively 
commented about the vitriol regarding the Shah. They felt that any accomplishment he made was 
a bad one, what little they attributed to him. She followed, “The effect of this approach is that it 
makes us see the ability to discern and make decisions, somewhere other than in women 
themselves and, as a result, we deny women’s agency, and render ourselves helpless and weak. 
Not only is this in conflict with reality, but it is also damaging to the women’s movement.”56 She 
believed in the universality of feminism and its ability to find spaces for women’s voices in the 
framework of any religious doctrine. 
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN: AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI 
Ironically, it was the chador, banned by Reza Shah as a symbol of women’s freedom 
and modernization, that was later used as a symbol by women who marched against 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s regime in protest, due to their adopted belief that women’s sexuality 
was being commodified by the monarchy and the removal of choice for women acted as a 
despotic imposition. As the Iranian Revolution of 1979 got underway, some women who were 
able to walk around in public without a veil for over 40 years, decided to use the veil as a symbol 
of opposition to the Pahlavi monarchy. The practice indicated the lasciviousness of Western 
modernity where female bodies were commodified. To the Islamic feminists, “True Islam, 
transcended the ‘traditional, deviatory and colonized Islam’ in relation to women. The failures of 
traditional Islam were seen as rooted in male-dominated culture and distorted interpretations of 
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Islamic laws.”57 Women hoped the new Islamic regime headed by Ayatollah Khomeini would 
create a dress code that was not targeted at a specific gender, but instead, simply required non-
arousing and modest body coverings for everyone. Women were under the impression that they 
would be major contributors to the Islamic Republic’s policies regarding gender, but that did not 
happen.  
 Instead, Khomeini ignored moderate voices and created hard line changes which altered 
life for women in Iran. Genders were segregated in public places such as trains and schools. The 
veil was compulsorily reintroduced. Changes to the political sphere were accompanied by the 
closure of women’s centers and the decline of women’s contributions to the economy. Khomeini, 
who praised women as “pillars of Iranian society” promoted the submission of women where the 
chador became, “a shroud of protective exclusion and bondage.” When thirty thousand women 
marched on the streets to protest the compulsory veiling, it was done so by a diverse 
representative group of women, but it led to fanatical responses of violence against women 
which, “revealed to them the indifference of leftist organization to women’s issues.”58 Islamist 
feminists argued against the mandate because they felt the old male dominated view of Islam 
was distorted. True Islam, they countered, should transcend antiquated traditions creating a more 
egalitarian position for women. “They proposed that the Islamic dress code should not be made 
specific to women but that both men and women should be required to wear simple and decent 
clothing which covers the body in a non-arousing, modest fashion.”59 Khomeini balked at any 
hint of moderation, clamping down on the Islamist women’s movement, nearly silencing them 
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for the duration of the Iran-Iraq War.60 
The Islamic Constitution of the new Republic touted women’s rights in its introduction. It 
mentioned the continued active and massive presence in their struggle and stated that men and 
women were equal before the law. “Through the creation of Islamic social infrastructures, all the 
elements of humanity that hitherto served the multifaceted foreign exploitation shall regain their 
true identity and human rights.”61 Unfortunately, many areas of law, especially the family law 
exposed differential treatments, values, and penalties.62 The Iranian Civil Code of 1982 lowered 
the legal age of maturity for girls and therefore marriage to 9.63 It stated in article 1041 that 
Marriage before the age, of majority was prohibited.64 It defined the age of majority in article 
1210, note 1: “the age of majority for boys is fifteen lunar years and for girls nine lunar years.”65 
The veil did not protect women who had lost their honor during the Pahlavi years. It 
negated female sexuality and removed male culpability for their supposedly uncontrollable 
impulses. “Many women who wore the veil as a protest symbol did not expect hijab (veiling) to 
become mandatory.”66 Islamic punishments became codified into law. Violations of wearing the 
veil earned lashings, adulterers were stoned, and thieves had their hands amputated. Bright colors 
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Revolutionary Committees, arresting people even out of their homes.67  
Before the Revolution, women were free from the veil with access to education, but 
continued to be relegated to a domestic space, even after they had earned more expansive 
employment opportunities. Afterward, they saw all their efforts erased by the new regime. From 
the Islamic perspective, women were forced to continue exposing their bodies as part of the 
exploitative commodifying modernity imposed by the Western-loving monarchal regime. “The 
Constitution attempted to create harmony between the Islamic family and nation by advocating a 
set of patriarchal relations to strengthen male control over women in the family on the one hand, 
and granting women the right to be active citizens on the other.”68 Women of the rural lower 
class were trapped identifying with male power and privilege that belonged to their fathers 
“within a sexual system that trafficked in women.”69  
After Khomeini rose to power, he annulled the family code. This took away the 
restrictions on men’s right to polygamous marriages and narrowed the ability for women to file 
for divorce. Temporary marriage was made legal once more, although it continued to be 
practiced in more traditional rural social groups. Temporary marriages were just like they 
sounded. They allowed people to get married with a sanction from the Islamic leaders, thus 
approved by God and State, for a shortened period ranging from 1 minute up to 99 years. It was 
an agreement where the man could be already married, but the woman had to be single. It 
amounted to a way to have a legal and sanctified sexual encounter. While it was frowned upon, it 
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was officially respectable because the Mullah issued the certificates. The certificates allowed 
young adults to go on vacation with the opposite sex and share a hotel room without any scandal. 
It could also be issued to opposite sex people who wanted to live together but who were not 
really committed to marriage. Of course, it was also given to married men so that they could 
keep concubines. Wives rarely knew about them, but this way, men were not officially being 
unfaithful. 
During this period women sought an ambiguous chimeric feminine space which rejected 
the Western capitalistic impositions on their bodies, continued to benefit from progressive 
secular modernity, pursued a cultural Iranian identity, and freed them from pre-Islamic 
patriarchal customs, while working within the framework of an Islamic fundamentalist 
interpretation of the holy texts. They worked to dig themselves out from the rubble and reclaim a 
space found between secular Persian nationalism and Islamic law. Women had been used as a 
symbol of progressive modernity for the Shah. Now they found themselves being touted as the 
mothers of the nation, relegated to the domestic space and regulated out of the public political 
spaces they had enjoyed.  
Following the Revolution, Farzaneh Milani observed, “women dominate the cultural 
imaginary by becoming emblems of national identity: “Forcefully unveiled, they personify the 
modernization of the nation. Compulsorily veiled, they embody the reinstitution of the Islamic 
Order.”70 The state reinstituted the Civil Code of 1936 and established many measures with the 
intent of protecting the Islamic family unit and de-sexualizing gender interactions in order to 
save citizens from the temptation of moral consequences. The Islamic state hoped to harness the 
power and activist capacity of the women’s movement and proceeded to hijack its mobilization 
 




potential just as the monarchy did in the 1970’s. By encouraging the development of the Islamic 
women’s movement, they hoped to counter the interests of secular feminism, a group which they 
had partnered with for the last decade. The Islamic Republic of Iran was successful in its divisive 
tactic and forced secular feminists into hiding or out of the country.71  
Women were important symbols during the revolution, and many had participated 
proudly. After the creation of the Islamic Republic, many women were disappointed and felt 
marginalized. They fled the country en masse as the Islamic state held mass arrests and 
executions. They stood together protesting a despotic monarchical regime who had strong-armed 
and killed several hundred people during its 50 years in power only to sweep in a new regime 
that managed to jail and kill thousands of political opponents in the first few years.   
When this kind of continued contestation exists, between modern Enlightenment ideals 
of equality and the framework of an Islamic polity, regimes resort to increased hegemonic 
controls in all public political spaces. Historically, the modern state of Iran has viewed 
political opponents as “enemies of the state,” regardless of which regime was in power. Iran 
used coercive economic bureaucracy as a tool to shape political spaces. They participated in 
massive developmental projects to temper civil society while modernizing their country. By 
withholding public political spaces from opponents, they inadvertently shoved oppositional 
discourse into private spaces. This allowed any resistance to become part of a hidden dialogue 
which could be constructed into mass demonstrations before being discovered.72 Other subtle 
forms of resistance could also be implemented in these private spaces such as less modest 
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clothing which ignored the impositions from the state. One other pitfall which arose from the 
removal of opposition from public spaces was the location of political debate. By moving all 
political debate into private spaces, the opposition was able to manufacture conspiracy 
theories, falsehoods, and sensationalist claims, at will, to subvert the authority of the state. 
There was no way to distinguish fact from fiction.73 
 Following the Revolution, religious scholars held a key place in Iran. The religious class 
became the ruling class and went from an opposition group to the dominant group in the political 
sphere. They created a new Constitution and formed a rarely seen democratic Islamic Republic. 
After fighting for years to establish the Family Protection Law of 1975, secular feminists saw it 
destroyed in the amount of time it took Khomeini to give one speech. “Khomeini asks women to 
recognize and accept that it is necessary that there be limitations on women’s individual 
freedoms; that although women may vote, be elected, and choose professions, those things must 
be done within the framework of Islam.”74 Khomeini held up the Islamic Republic’s provision of 
women’s right to own property as an indication of their economic independence, however he 
also saw this freedom as the origin of the unraveling of the institution of the family. It was 
responsible for the immorality which was permeating society, the minimization of male gender 
roles, and the absence of love. Women were characterized as tempests of promiscuity, untamed 
beasts of lasciviousness capable of corrupting men, requiring the control and regulation of their 
behavior and bodies.75  
Life in rural villages was no better. “Women stay home more as public space has become 
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male space, even in the village. Less visible than ever before, women in Iran seem to be mere 
shadows behind their dark veils.”76 The continuation of women’s education was promoted 
enabling large percentages of women, an even larger percentage than men, to attend university. 
Unfortunately, the state did not pursue active policies when it came to women’s employment. 
Instead, women were encouraged to attend schools because they continued to be the mothers of 
young boys who would eventually be men. Without enough education, mothers would not know 
enough to properly raise them and be able to teach them in the household. It was male sons after 
all, who would provide for them in old age.   
During Khomeini’s reign as Supreme Leader, the period of Islamization, or societal shift 
toward Islam, Iran was bogged down in a war with Iraq. Women were asked to compensate for 
the loss of men to the armed forces. Islamist women’s groups were silenced during the war, but 
by the end of the decade, women’s dissent manifested in something termed “the politics of 
nagging.” Women commented on daily life and the hardships women faced during the war and 
even about the war itself, instigating a noticeable shift in public opinion.77 Women were asked to 
produce manpower for the war, by being mothers. They inadvertently initiated the creation of 
public space by leaving the home to shop and tend to the issues of raising their families without 
their husbands present. Some were even asked to enter the workforce, earning missing wages 
that helped their families to survive. As the war ended, women were forced back into domestic 
spaces, but they chided the government and embraced the vital role which they occupied during 
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the war years.78  
The economic hardship of the war had given women a public presence. After the war 
with Iraq, tens of thousands of women went on to volunteer with organizations outside the home.  
“One impressive example of voluntarism was the Ministry of Health’s 
mobilization of some 25,000 women in Tehran in the early 1990s to educate 
urban lower-class families about hygiene and birth control; mounting population 
growth (3.9 percent between 1980 and 1985 and 3.4 percent between 1985 and 
1990) had caused the regime great political anxiety, and these women contributed 
to decreasing the rate to a low of 1.7 percent between 1990 and 1995.”79 
 
Women resisted by continuing to make their public presences felt. They resisted patiently, 
wearing their head covering incorrectly, sparking battles and confrontations with morality police. 
Some women received warnings; others were arrested. Women, “insisted on exerting individual 
choice and entitlement, which challenged both the egalitarian claims of the Islamic state and the 
premises of orthodox Islam.”80 Women found new ways to redefine their volunteer roles as 
Health Workers. They acted as partners to the Ministry of Health to passively inject their 
presence into other areas of the public sphere.81 As they infiltrated the neighborhoods, they 
introduced many subtle changes in their communities. They transformed familial traditional 
structures and embodied and exampled life as an equal partner to their husbands, instead of a 
subservient wife. “In short, these women view their volunteer health work as an avenue of public 
participation and reinterpretation, if not subversion, of the regime’s gender ideology.”82 The 
Ministry was not able to keep their volunteerism apolitical because ‘women’s rights are human 
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rights’, so whenever women are involved, they are consequently political agents. The 
transformation of the community familial units was due the failure of the Ministry of Health to 
recognize women as human when they implemented these health programs. 
 Islamic women, as devout as ever, began to ask questions. Women had been mothers to 
the nation and after the war ended, it became apparent that the restrictions placed on them were 
not equal nor equitable. They had a lot of what seemed to be individual mundane issues, but in 
totality, they were an avalanche of demands which caused retribution from the Republic. “In the 
end, the rather abstract philosophical approach of Islamist women proved insufficient to 
accommodate women’s desire for individual choice within an Islamist framework.”83 
Different groups using various realities to incorporate change all claimed true Islam in 
their interpretations of the texts. Each group he explained was made up of a population of 
Muslims on a continuum of belief. Islam could never be monolithic due to varied perceptions, 
practices, and interpretations. Orthodox Islam’s authoritarian view imposed patriarchal power 
where God had usurped the agency of people. Sociologist Asef Bayat explained that Islam was 
no longer seen as just a religion by the West. It was identified as a political entity which 
constructed democracy as a foreign idea which diminished the will of God to deliver popular 
power. 84 Other Islamists constructed democracy as a component already within Islam. “Rashid 
al-Ghanoushi, for instance suggested that “Islamic rule is by nature democratic.” The Quranic 
notion of Shura (consultation) revealed the equality of race and gender in Islam.85 Women’s 
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groups needed to find liberal reinterpretations of religious texts by legitimate authorities that 
were compatible with democratic ideals. Women sought religious scholars and even doctors to 
include acceptable male voices in the political sphere. Many times, it was the men who delivered 
the final queries to the members of the Majles, to bring about change. Women understood that 
insisting on direct female confrontation in many instances would not help their cause. Their 
voices were best heard when they could create energy in a popular movement, supported by the 
majority. This method of remaining in the background while men made their voices heard is 
another example of a subtle and passive, but conscious resistance used by women to serve the 
bigger picture in the struggle for equal rights.  
It was not enough for women to find new interpretations to further their cause. They 
needed to find interpretations that could be made valid by those who resided in the system and 
could imbue the reading with power, such as the clerics. For women’s purposes, it was the 
clerics who mediated between “the word and the world.”86 The reason this was effective was that 
Islam was not a social movement, it wanted to create a society that was fundamentally Islamic, 
where the good of Islam could infiltrate and trickle down onto everyone. By instigating change 
from the top down through the implementation of law based on new valid interpretation, 
women’s groups were able to assist all of society, including the poor.87 
POST ISLAMIST FEMINISM 
The change from Islamist feminism to Post-Islamist feminism in the mid-90’s was 
characterized by a shift in the analysis of the women’s movement in Iran. Over time Post-
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Islamist feminism became identified as both a political and social condition, and a project.88 
Feminists, took up the challenge of accommodating women’s desire for individual choice housed 
within an Islamic framework. They sought to reinterpret Islam through a more inclusive feminist 
lens. The goal was to broaden their ability to achieve women’s equality by building a coalition of 
feminisms, regardless of their origins or ties to Islamic or secular thought. Their new position 
identified the imperfection of patriarchal systems but, recognized the positive components of 
them as well. The West was still viewed by many as immoral and guilty of commodifying 
women’s bodies, but it also had democracy and science. The inclusivity allowed feminist 
activists to identify as women, instead of Islamic or secular women, to articulate their 
membership in the global fight for women’s rights.89 They were able to point their fingers at 
political and patriarchal perceptions as vectors for gender inequalities that were rooted in issues 
of power. Women interpreters moved past literal meanings and instead embraced, “interpretive 
and historical deductions.”90 
Thus, Post Islamist feminism was an attempt to fuse Islamic and secular ideals, 
understanding that neither democracy nor Islam were monolithic. “It is an attempt to turn the 
underlying principles of Islamism on its head by emphasizing rights instead of duties, plurality in 
place of singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scriptures, and the future 
instead of the past.”91 It was an effort by women to obtain rights by separating religion from state 
politics, while maintaining religious dispositions. To uncover new interpretations, women turned 
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to linguistics to deconstruct the original intent of the texts. 
Issues were rooted in fiqh, or the human understanding of the divine Islamic law as 
revealed in the Quran. In classical fiqh the distinctions for male and female, for instance, were 
not the same as the biological sex taxonomies recognized today. Likewise, jins, which was also 
contemporarily used to describe male and female, meant genus. For the Islamic scholar, “the 
insistence on these definitional distinctions enables him to argue against those scholars who 
oppose sex change on the basis of opposition to changing God’s work of creation. He argues that 
change of male to female and vice versa is not a change in the genus of a created being; it is a 
change in his/her jinsi apparatus.”92 
Science found the cause of a statement.  Fiqh did not care about the cause. It only wanted 
to ensure that the rules were being followed, which meant is resided within the bounds of the 
framework of Islamic thought and was therefore a valid reinterpretation of the texts.93 Jins had 
roots in Persian and had an affiliation with “sex” but was not identical, especially when trying to 
define it in English. The effect of America’s scientific discourses illustrated the pervasiveness of 
English on the scientific status of a word, based on the place and time when American scientists 
put the word into usage, without acknowledging or even understanding the depth of the 
etymology of that word.  
Gender concerns were often revealed as women’s concerns. Considering the domination 
of the patriarchal system in familial life due to tradition, Islamic practices, and gendered 
nationalism, forms of women’s resistance disclosed themselves in the strategies they formed 
within these constraints. Because of Iran’s unique national identity which resided in a discursive 
 





collocation between a “pre-Islamic glorification of Persianness, and a territorially bound 
membership in Shi’a Islam,” gender roles were dually affected. Gendered nationalism in the 
case of Iran normalized the representation of the male gender from both identities stationing 
women into subordinate spaces populated by overlapping sets of oppressive traditions, a 
veritable Venn diagram of patriarchy, whose only constant commonality was the imposition 
on equality. In some cases, women had no better options than to construct what Deniz 























Women continued to claw back space that was lost. They worked from spaces that were 
assigned to them by a patriarchal regime and resisted in many forms. Some of the methods were 
through vehement protestation and direct action, some via more subtle or behind the scenes 
pressures, and others through the careful and purposeful analyzation of Islamic justification of 
law, to create new spaces and bring about change. Women were able to confront the assignation 
of gender roles, family planning programs, and the valuation of virginity. They sought to 
rearticulate their identities in both public and private spaces challenging traditions and customs 
rooted in secular and Islamic histories. They contested attempts to control female bodies 
challenging issues of premarital sex, hymenoplasty, contraceptives and blood or sheet 
ceremonies. They carved out space confronting topics like dating, head coverings, divorce, 
polygamy, and abortion. They created small public voices to baby step their way to progress, by 
working from the private spaces to which they were relegated. For every step forward in the 
struggle for women’s rights, there was pushback by the conservative religious ruling groups. It 
was this back-and-forth tug of war that continued to characterize women’s resistance in Iran 
since the Revolution. The struggle for women’s rights was a hegemonic confrontation which 
slowly shifted the continuum of women’s rights as they constantly staked claims within the 
chimeric spaces defined between Iranian and Islamic identities but were ultimately confined by 
the Islamic framework which imprisoned it.  
PATRIARCHAL BARGAINS 
These negotiated locations allowed women to create individualized survival spaces 
from which they could shape, “women’s gendered subjectivity and determine the nature of 




actual forms of women’s active or passive resistance.”94 These transformable strategies 
watched women conform to gender rules that were unfavorable so that they could reposition 
themselves into spaces which provided more beneficial footing and the possibility of future 
resistive discourses. By submitting to their patriarchally determined positions, putting 
themselves in subordinate spaces to more senior women in the household, in addition to all 
men, a location removed from their own kin group, they faced hardship and isolation.   
 Patriarchal bargains are not specifically Iranian by nature, however, the unique elusive 
space created by dueling identities in Iran, provided the perfect space for women to create 
from within while remaining on the margins. By enrolling in these patriarchal bargains young 
brides subjected themselves to authority and governance. Resistance by these women began 
with active avoidance of their mother-in-law’s control. Young mothers worked to inculcate 
unwavering devotion from their sons who would be responsible for their care when they got 
older. Meanwhile, older women in the household labored to suppress the couple’s conjugal 
bond and wrest away the allegiance of the children. “A woman’s life cycle in the patrilocally 
extended family is such that the deprivation and hardship she may experience as a young 
bride are eventually superseded by the control and authority she will have over her own 
daughters-in-law.”95 One of the only ways to break out of this cycle was for women to seek 
educational opportunities which might allow them to start earning their own income, granting 
them more freedom and agency. 
 “Although sexual and other services were wifely duties according to the law, child 
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bearing was not.”96 By requiring sex but not the creation of offspring, who might later take care 
of the women after the husband died, or established a right to inheritance, it provided a vehicle 
for abuse. Considering these pressures, women became socio-legally bound as receptacles for 
their husband’s seminal deposits. Since reproduction had special benefits especially for women, 
there was no need to codify the practice, aside from ensuring their virginity at the time of 
marriage and their perpetual faithfulness. Contraception and abortion became tools that 
perpetuated this relationship instead of being used as methods for women to have control of their 
own bodies.  
The only acceptable women in the Islamic state were the ones who followed Shari’a law, 
accepting the patriarchal interpretation of Islam from the government. Khomeini’s Iran 
perpetuated the notion that a women’s relationship with men could alienate them from their 
nature. Men and women were equal in the eyes of God. They both had political and social 
responsibilities as well as an obligation to pay zakat. But while the belief was that men and 
women had equal rights, Iranian women knew they were not the same rights. Issues like 
polygamy, adultery, and fornication found justification in the traditional interpretations which 
concluded men’s superiority and authority over women. This was an attractive and empowering 
view for poor rural women living in more commonly Islamic households who used the decrees to 
make men responsible for their care and well-being. The educated and middle-class, from more 
urban areas, who pursued careers and lived more secular lives, felt it was not appropriate for the 
government to define the true nature of a woman. For those women who opposed these religious 
interpretations the pursuit of more modern intersections identified them as exploited victims of 
immorality. The only avenues left for women to make their voices heard dwelled in their ability 
 




to reinterpret the very verses which validated and cemented the patriarchal traditions they were at 
war with.97 
The juridical principal of ijma, or consensus, allowed for new authoritative legal adoption 
which could supersede existing laws. Ijma was the universal and infallible agreement of Muslim 
scholars or of the whole Muslim community regarding an interpretation. It allowed for Islamic 
lawmakers to refocus on new fundamentals in the Quran and Hadith, regarding Muslim women 
and their place, role, and treatment. This principal allowed the production of valid sanctions for 
new codes which replaced any repressive or patriarchal laws that existed in the past or which 
may come under scrutiny in the future. As women’s movements urged Islamic scholars to 
continue to debate the “True Islam”, space was created for women to appropriate. Homa Hoodfar 
recognized the benefit of Islamic feminists over secular feminists during this period and 
indicated that women were distinguishing between patriarchal traditions and Islamic 
fundamentalist interpretations. “The advantage of the new Islamist feminists over more 
secularized “Western” activists is that they challenge and reform the Islamic doctrine from 
within rather than advocating a Western model of gender relations.”98 
CONTRACEPTION 
 After the formation of the Family Planning Board in 1989, health houses provided rural 
areas with locations to obtain public services. There were not enough of them to meet the needs 
of women. Although there were more women in universities than men, there were still not 
enough female doctors to service every woman, as was required by Islamic law. Women were 
placed in charge of birth control, which was made available from the government, however, it 
 
 





constructed negative connotations for unwed women, painting them as sluts. Women were 
required to make monthly visits to doctors to obtain the prescriptive medicines. This was 
difficult for rural peoples and people from low socioeconomic status environments due to the 
traveling costs. Many women were embarrassed and ashamed to admit having sex out of 
wedlock, as virginity carries such importance for getting married in the Islamic cultural practices 
of Iran. 
 Most women seeking contraception were on the pill. To monitor women’s health, they 
were expected to get regular monthly checkups to renew their supply. With so few doctors to 
serve all the women, it was difficult to obtain regular appointments. Even those who did take the 
pill regularly, did not always take the dose as prescribed. “One 1991 study covering 1,000 urban 
and 1,000 rural households in Tehran province, where the public is assumed to have easier 
access to information, indicated that over 25 percent of participants, including rural and urban 
and a considerable number of literate women, took the pill either every other night or only before 
intercourse.”99 
In 1989, the Reproductive Health and Family Planning Program was revived. It raised the 
number of women who used contraception and reduced the fertility rate giving women a measure 
of control over their bodies. The gap between urban and rural contraceptive use shrank by ten 
percent, but it was largely due to better educated urban couples finally mastering the practice of 
withdrawal, resulting in a reduction in the birthrate for young married women from 6.6 children 
in 1986 to only 2.1 children in 2000. That same year, seventy-three percent of married women 
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between the ages of 15 and 49 were using contraception in Iran.100  
 Another factor which contributed to the success of the Family Planning Program and in 
the increased safety of women occurred in 1993 when the Republic removed the economic 
incentives which rewarded couples for having multiple children. It ended the policy where 
parents would receive government subsidies for every child beyond the third child. They 
withdrew food coupons and ended paid maternity leave. In 2001, Iran opened their first condom 
factory which distributed more than 70 million specimens a year. The government, to further 
curtail population growth, offered free tubal ligations and vasectomies. Initially, the Shi’ite 
ulama had ethical concerns, but the Shi’ite jurists determined that sterilization was not body 
disfigurement, as had been concluded in other branches of Islam. They pronounced that it was 
merely a form of medical surgery so long as it was not permanent. They argued that tubal 
ligations and vasectomies could be reversed. Years later, in 2007, Ayatollah Khamenei explicitly 
removed the reversibility condition from the practice.101 They remained free of charge until 
2012. Later, the government, in a desperate attempt to jumpstart the birthrate, pursued bills 
which would have penalized the surgeries with jailtime and blood money fines.  
These swings by the government between encouraging fertility rates and promoting 
fertility limitation destabilized portions of women’s resistance. When fertility rates were high 
women were able to passively postpone subsequent pregnancies for a short time, up to two years 
by breastfeeding.102 Women’s organizations inserted their voices into the public dialogues with 
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their entreaties to begin family planning programs which would limit fertility rates. These efforts 
targeted familial traditional impositions on women’s bodies as vessels for procreation. When 
fertility rates were low the government initiated policies, which cut previously won services such 
as subsidized contraception and abortions. They increased maternity and paternity leave seeking 
to reinvigorate the growth of families, consigning women to their traditional domestic roles as 
mothers, without any discourse. Wives had no choice but to reclaim their fuller identities as 
women, lest they became thought of as mere apparatuses to produce male heirs. These 
fluctuations in fertility resulted in endless contestation vacillating the positions of women to have 
their voices heard. 
THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION 
 Some of the ways that the Tehrani youth resisted the theocratic rulings were to pushback 
against the demands of modesty set by the regime, which tried to enforce mandatory social and 
moral codes of behavior according to their orthodox interpretation of Islamic law. “The Islamic 
clergy, in power in Iran since the revolution of 1979, sought to operationalize its power through a 
fabric of morality and by imposing their interpretations of Islamic ways of life on Iranian 
citizens.”103 By resisting they hoped to take back agency of their own bodies, while attempting to 
establish new perspectives on equality, sexual purity, and gender segregation.104 There was a 
hedonistic culture of lascivious rebellion centered around premarital sex and other sexual 
behavior. Included were practices like, wearing less head and body coverings or wearing them in 
ways which revealed slightly more than they should. They wore brightly colored headscarves to 
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express personality and style, a rebellion of personal control over their own selves. Rebellious 
activities included marital infidelity, and the illegal practice of hymen reconstruction, which 
targeted the social and cultural religious customs centered around virginity before marriage. This 
insurgency, especially for women, was couched in a religious culture that also labeled 
promiscuous women as ‘sluts’ and ‘tainted’, formidable obstacles to future marriage prospects 
who valued virginity at the time of marriage above all else. Women struggled with the intense 
social pressures and ramifications of their decisions. On one hand, these women wanted to be 
active members of their peer group, date love interests, and participate in the changing sexual 
culture. On the other hand, they feared that should they lose their virginity, they would no longer 
be considered good candidates for marriage and could become estranged from their parents and 
family or even remain single.105 
 After the passing of Khomeini, women increased their pressure on the state to grant more 
reforms. Eventually, women started to practice discrete forms of resistance to the Islamic 
theocratic impositions of laws which sought to control the lives of Iranian citizens and were 
enforced by the morality police, the infamous Komite. These forms of resistance manifested in 
the lives of young urban adults struggling to understand the justification of seemingly arbitrary 
rules governing their lives. This sexual and sociocultural revolution was played out in the streets 
and homes of Tehran, sparked by the defiant discourse of young urban Iranians. 
 The changing sexual behavior of Tehrani youth, in the face of religious governmental 
pushback against President Khatami’s reforms, displayed an intersectionality between sexuality 
and politics. As the theocratic regime infiltrated more of their lives, attempting to govern female 
 
 





bodies, the youth resisted the strict moral policies. This took place at a time when young adults 
made up the majority of the population and struggled as Iran moved through a depressed 
economic period, leaving many searching for work, unhappy with the government’s inability to 
pass policies to right the ship.106 
This sexual revolution took place in both the public and private spheres of urban culture. 
Publicly, the resistance defied Islamic dress codes, replacing the typical mass demonstrations in 
the streets that took place in other countries. Privately, sexual behaviors took the form of 
political dissent voiced in sequestered spaces but forced into public discourse. This occurred 
because the Iranian morality police, the Komite, investigated and pursued justice into the private 
homes of citizens. Any private acts became public acts of resistance because they were arrested, 
persecuted, and punished for acts determined to be morally criminal behaviors, even behind 
closed doors.107 Women’s bodies were invaded when the police checked for the status of female 
virginity. As time passed, these acts of resistance began to delegitimize the immutable voice of 
the theocratic regime.  
MARRIAGE ALTERNATIVES WITHIN AN ISLAMIC FRAMEWORK 
 The valuation of virginity, defined by both identities imposed on the women of Iran, 
demarcated sharp boundaries for premarital behaviors. The arbitrary trophy needed only to be 
sustained until the resplendent moment of their wedding night consummation, evidenced by the 
tell-tale spotting on the sheets, proof of the unpolluted offering of themselves to their husbands. 
Women during the post-revolutionary period found alternatives despite the threat of punishment 
both legal and vigilante. The common belief among the faithful that premarital sex was 
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disrespectful and dishonorable led family members to exact their own justice or in some cases to 
assist law enforcement agencies in these apprehensions. In one case, as recently as 2004, there 
was news of a, “public execution of a seventeen-year-old girl who was turned in to the 
authorities by her grandfather, who suspected her of engaging in premarital sex.”108 In this 
context, the valuation of virginity ushered in a devaluation of women’s lives. 
Although efforts were being made to shift Islamic laws by introducing more liberal 
interpretations of religious texts, young Iranian adults continued to live their lives guided by the 
socio-legal parameters whose circumvention could have resulted in legal penalties or harassment 
from the community. Options for couples who weren’t ready for marriage but who desired to 
express their sexual freedom included those which continued to operate within the framework of 
patriarchal constraints. Women worked to expunge societal violations reproducing a tabula rasa, 
a blank slate of virginity, leaving future inquisitors none the wiser. Choices included, thigh sex, 
oral or anal sex, hymen reconstruction, and abortion. 
Combined with the promotion of education and a robust industrialization, these 
occupations of public spaces by women’s voices correlated with positive changes. The biggest 
impacts took place in the urban areas which tended to be less conservative than rural areas and 
where higher rates of education led to more economic empowerment for women.109 Immediately 
following the Revolution the minimum age for girls to marry was lowered from 18 to 9. Thanks 
to women’s efforts, the age was raised back to 13 by the end of the 1980’s however, a critique of 
data from the Statistical Center of Iran focusing on a Survey of Socio-economic Characteristics 
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of the Family, revealed that the percentage of women who married at a young age slightly 
decreased over the period of the survey, from 1966-2002. Furthermore, as the Islamic Republic 
established Shari’a law, the age gap between men and women’s first marriages shrunk, thanks 
largely to a gradual increase in the mean age of women.110 There was also a decline in arranged 
marriages and an increase in the number of single women in Iran. “The latter point is particularly 
interesting because, legally, men can have more than one wife. But the increasing number of 
single women indicates that polygyny is not a widely accepted practice.”111 The shift in attitudes 
since the Revolution has not manifested in the dialogue promoted by the Islamic Republic, but it 
clearly has become evident in the popular decisions that couples made in the home and in their 
interpersonal relationships.  
Due to the socioreligious threat of shaming which surrounded public displays of affection 
and premarital sex, young couples were not able to participate in courting practices. There was 
no space where couples could publicly be unwed and be together in public, without a chaperone. 
This made it very difficult to develop any relationships. Instead, Tehrani youth were forced to 
hide their coupling by sneaking away moments in cars or empty houses. This put pressure on 
young dating couples to make the most of the little private time that they could acquire, so they 
often opted to introduce sex very quickly into their relationships, as there were very little dating 
options. Consequently, the relationships evolved to function solely as sexual opportunities. In 
these cases, the restrictive cultural and religious environment served as a contributor to resistance 
against itself. 
 Due to the socioreligious requirement of bridal virginity, women were made responsible 
 
 





for their purity. Hymenoplasty, the surgical procedure which restores the hymen to produce 
bleeding after sex on the wedding night, became an option for those willing and able to pay a 
doctor covertly. Bleeding buoyed the conviction that the female was a virgin and thus would 
only ever produce a child from her new husband. Sheet or blood ceremonies verified that there 
was no danger that a new wife could have been pregnant with someone else’s child during the 
wedding or could lead to a child being raised by someone who was not the child’s father. 
Following the turn of the century when the sexual revolution was in full swing, hymenoplasty 
became widespread, amidst religious objections, and was accepted as a “tactful solution for 
rebellious girls trying to negate unequal power relations and negotiate between dominant models 
of gender and their own subjective experiences.”112 
 Girls were always expected to be unavailable sexually in Iran, due to Islamic policies of 
shame. And while women were not viewed as the sex which was weaker when it came to 
temptation, they were viewed as more controllable. This coupled with a long history of 
patriarchal views placed the sole responsibility on women to maintain purity. Men did not have 
the same apparatus of shame attached to their sexuality and purity. Thus, for those who could 
afford it, the surgical procedure of hymenoplasty was made a valid option which cosmetically 
solved the problem. For those less fortunate, without access or funds, the solution consisted of 
two small caplets full of red fluid, which were inserted just before the wedding night activity, to 
sufficiently produce the desired result, blood on the sheets. “The evidence suggests that women 
who engage in premarital sex and subsequent hymenoplasty, use their bodies as a mark of 
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resistance to the state and its hierarchies.”113 By circumventing the imposition of the patriarchal 
valuation of virginity at the time of marriage, women were able to work within the constraints of 
the framework imposed on them. While appearing to accommodate the superordinate system 
whey were able to perpetuate a scheme of survival and persistence. 
Women who obtained hymenoplasties did so in opposition to the patriarchal rules, 
redefining the discourse based on the reality of their lives, by choosing to secure power for 
themselves. By resisting the sociocultural mores which governed cultural Tehrani youth, they 
were seizing social control and wresting it away from the intrusive state which had imposed 
those theocratic judgments upon them. Consequently, the efforts were beginning to make strides 
in changing the responsibility of gendered constructs. In 2006, “Qom-based Islamic cleric 
Ayatollah Rouhani issued a fatwa (religious ruling) clarifying that hymenoplasty is permissible 
under Iran’s Islamic law, stating that there was “no difference between a real or a fake 
hymen.”114 
Over time some progress was made. “These young adults have succeeded in capturing the 
attention of members of the regime and in bringing about change. Their ability to affect President 
Rafsanjani’s conservative policies is evidence that political change happened.”115 As the largest 
population group in the country, the youth of Iran were able to appeal to the political leader in 
this Republic because their votes were needed. This change in culture resulted in a “loosening of 
social restrictions” at times. It led to a more open dialogue about sexual comportment and the 
ability of the government to infiltrate the lives and behaviors of citizens.  
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Still, despite the inroads made, discrimination in law and practice continued to be enacted 
on women in Iran. A constant political battle continued to navigate and define the space between 
Islamic feminism and non-Western modernity. For every loosened social restriction, one was 
reinstituted. There were constant efforts to co-opt political power through the shifting of pawns 
on the chessboard of social control. Violence against women and girls, including domestic 
violence continued. The legal age of marriage remained at 13, with parental consent and younger 
than 13 with permission from a judge who got special requests from grandfathers or fathers who 
wished to marry their daughters off at even younger ages.116 Early marriage is seen a key 
behavior for maintaining domesticity and motherhood. It is how men maintain traditional 
gendered roles in marriage.117 It hinted at the idea that the opposition to democratic values and 
gender equality was based on more than their interpretation of the religious texts. In 2019, a 
video of an 11 year old girl getting married in Iran caused shock and outrage. Authorities were 
pressured into investigating the event and ultimately annulled the temporary marriage and 
brought charges against the would-be husband, the cleric who married them, and the child’s 
caretakers. They violated the law because they did not obtain permission from a judge.118  
 Some single women participated in thigh sex as they became prepared to experiment 
sexually before marriage. Girls coming from strict or religious families often believed that 
occupying the same confined space as a boy constituted a sin. Premarital sex would have been 
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too far for conservative women to leap. La-paee provided an opportunity for experimentation 
which operated within an Islamic framework. Thigh sex was exactly what it sounded like. It was 
where a man thrusts his erect penis between a woman’s clenched thighs to achieve an orgasm.119 
The practice acted as a way for women to reclaim a portion of their sexual freedom from societal 
bondage without sacrificing the boundaries which they accepted. 
 Like thigh sex, oral and anal sex continued in the same tradition while shifting the 
boundary further down the continuum of sexual freedom. These forms of non-vaginal sex were a 
way for women to rebel against repressive traditions and impositions on their sexual relations. 
While anal sex and other non-vaginal forms of sex may keep women from getting pregnant, it 
does not prevent the spread of disease, nor the patriarchal demands of men. A twenty-five-year-
old English teacher named Sharare, when interviewed by Pardis Mahdavi, commented about the 
practice negatively, “Women have gotten creative. Anal sex. They do a lot of that, and at young 
ages. For them it’s a way to keep their virginity intact, but I think they are just making fools of 
themselves.”120 When illustrating the prevalence of anal sex as a substitute for vaginal sex, to 
maintain their socially and religiously required virginity, among the youth of Tehran, Ramita 
Navai described it as “ubiquitous.”121 
ABORTION AND CONTROLLING WOMEN’S BODIES 
Prior to the work of the WOI, abortion was illegal under any circumstance. The only 
exception was for married women whose life was in jeopardy and it was determined that the 
operation would save them. The punishment for illegal abortion, self-administered or without 
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proof of jeopardy, was up to three years in prison for the women and up to ten years for the 
person who performed the abortion. After the “legalization” in the 1976 Penal Code, abortions 
were permitted because it removed the punitive measures against the physician who performed it 
if stipulations were met. The abortion needed to be performed in a hospital or clinic within the 
first 12 weeks of pregnancy. The operation needed to be medically safe for the mother and 
required the written consent of both parents. Finally, the couple needed to provide evidence of 
medical or social reasoning for the abortion. In the case of the former, the physician needed to 
attain the medical opinions of two other doctors.122 
The imposition of Islamic law after the Revolution erased the gains made by the WOI, 
making abortion illegal again, aside from the exception to save the mother’s life. “Under the 
Penal Code of 1991, which was revised on the basis of a reformist interpretation of Islamic law, 
abortion became classified as a “lesser crime” involving bodily injury, which in turn is 
punishable by three to ten years in prison, accompanied by the payment of diya (blood money) or 
compensation paid to the “victim” or, in the case of the “victim’s” death, to their relatives – in 
the instance of abortion, to the father of the fetus.”123 This was consistent with the belief that 
wives and children were property of the husband. Women are held responsible for inducing 
abortion, while men are not punished by law unless they personally perform the abortion, 
themselves. Furthermore, women suffer disproportionately as the sole parent who is responsible 
for abortion. “Children’s rights activists in Iran have highlighted the need to eliminate 
inconsistencies in Iranian law as one reason why the abortion law should be reformed, e.g. the 
punishment for killing a child who is already born is less than that for terminating a 
 







Between 1995 and 2000, the number of abortions in Iran was a staggering 2,590,681. 
Nearly as surprising were the 5,697 deaths which occurred due to unsafe abortions during the 
same period. Amongst countries from the Middle East and North Africa, Iran’s mortality rate 
versus abortions was the third highest. (out of 21 countries)125 In 2005 two fatwas were issued by 
Islamic jurists. They are legal opinions in response to questions posed, based on interpretations 
of holy texts. These issuances said abortion in the case of a genetic disorder was permissible 
before ensoulment. The other permitted the procedure in cases when the pregnancy risked the 
mother’s life or health.126 Fatwas are nonbinding unless they are codified into law. 
Further fundamentalist interpretations established that the proper term for the ensoulment 
of a child occurs when the pregnancy is in its 120th day. This led to the passage of a new 
proposed law in 2005 which stipulated that abortions could legally take place for married women 
if the pregnancy was terminated within the first four months, there was consent from both sets of 
parents of the married couple, and the damage (deformity due to mental or physical handicap) of 
the fetus was confirmed by three doctors and the coroner’s office. Also, a pregnant mother’s 
consent was to be considered sufficient for therapeutic abortion. During this debate in the Majlis, 
all 13 of the women in Parliament sat out. This bill also confirmed that rape was not a valid 
reason for an abortion.127 Sharia law prevented the Guardian Council from accepting the law. 
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They disagreed with the new interpretation and determined mental or physical handicap which 
would cause financial hardship was not legal.128 They also rejected the exceptions allowing 
abortion for fetal impairment.129 After the Majlis revised and re-ratified the bill, the Guardian 
Council vigorously debated and approved the law.  
The newly revised law no longer contained the provision for a pregnant woman’s 
consent. This was an important weapon in the fight for equality. Without the ability of a pregnant 
woman to give full legal consent for therapeutic abortion, women were robbed of the ability to 
control their own bodies in a patriarchal society, where traditionally, a husband’s consent was 
also required. So, women took up the fight through the offices of the Iran Legal Medicine 
Organization (LMO) by getting medical professionals to make the case. The LMO conferred 
with the head of the judiciary branch, who was also a cleric and could issue fatwas, about 
allowing requests by the mother without need for verification of marital status or fathers’ 
consent. “This situation continued until October 2012 when LMO announced that the mothers’ 
consent would be sufficient.”130 This process of using their voices to inspire medical 
professionals or legal scholars to arbitrate on women’s behalf was a valuable tool in the fight for 
equality. It allowed for the creation of space within the framework in which Iranians existed. It 
took advantage of the smaller achievable victories without demanding the absolute ideal. And, it 
assisted women in working toward creating a cavern of space for their political voices to be 
heard, one spoonful at a time.  
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Approximately 73,000 illegal abortions happen every year in Iran.131 Many are performed 
by doctors risking their medical licenses. Others self-administer them using “morning after” 
pills. During the sexual revolution in Tehran, finding doctors who would perform illegal 
abortions was relatively easy for people with money. For those who were less fortunate, cheaper 
options existed such as the black market sale of abortion pills or even shots which were meant 
for animals. The cost runs around $200 US dollars for the procedure alone, which does not 
account for any aftercare. “The high cost of abortion in Iran is mainly due to the fact that a 
woman needs to purchase an injectable medicine from the black market, or pay a large amount of 
money to an illegal health practitioner to abort her unwanted pregnancy.”132 Physicians often 
needed to provide emergency aid to people who attempted to perform an illegal abortion. Side 
effects from abortion complications include, “nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and lower abdominal 
cramps and massive vaginal bleeding.” Many of the people who need emergency aid due to 
incomplete abortions receive assistance for infections and psychological distresses.133  
“Complication of unsafe abortion are a significant cause of maternal mortality, estimated 
to be responsible for 5 percent of maternal deaths.”134 Due to the strict legal abortion policy in 
Iran it is easy to deduce that illegal abortions would be more common in less religious regions. In 
Iran there is a significantly higher rate of incidence in urban areas than in rural areas. Because of 
this, there is also a much higher number of pregnancies per women at the end of their 
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reproductive years who are employed than there are versus women who are unemployed.135 
Women from all regions use contraceptives of one kind or another, which includes withdrawal. 
Contraceptive use and the incidence of abortion is inversely related.136 This suggests that 
abortion numbers reflect a connection to religiosity. “High prevalence of modern contraception 
helps women attain their ideal small family size, and high levels of religiosity diminishes the 
probability of undergoing an abortion when a contraceptive failure occurs, or no contraceptive is 
used.”137 A system developed which functioned from within the Islamic space and worked for 
women. As it stood, women were able to get pre-natal screenings, but had no legal recourse to 
get an abortion. This raised serious ethical concerns. It questioned the, “moral, social, and 
psychological consequences for women and couples who are informed of a serious congenital 
abnormality, but who have no legal mechanisms to procure a termination.” 138 
When fundamentalist jurists sought and found interpretations to justify legal abortion 
before ensoulment in 2005, they focused on fetal impairment, listing 29 fetal and 32 maternal 
abnormalities or diseases, including congenital disabilities like thalassemia. Thalassemia was a 
blood disorder where not enough red blood cells were produced. “The economic and social cost 
of thalassemia is high due to patients’ lifelong need for monthly blood transfusions and treatment 
with the iron chelating agent desferrioxamine.”139 It was the high incidence of this disorder 
which prompted the health sector to ask jurists to reevaluate the law. “In Iran for example, the 
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estimated cost of treating 15,000 thalassemia patients is US $200 million per year.140 By 
appealing to religious authorities, it allowed the jurists to work on new viable interpretations 
which might have validated a change.  
La-haraj which means “unbearable difficulty in Arabic, was one of the validations that 
jurists used to justify the Therapeutic Abortion Act. “The rule of La-haraj states that the religion 
never imposes unbearable difficulty to its believers. Therefore, if the pregnancy imposes such a 
burden to a woman or her family, the Islamic law does not ask her to continue that 
pregnancy.”141 Via this method, public concern was able to use the Islamic jurists to find 
religious interpretations which led to the passage of a new law regarding abortion. The Guardian 
Council eventually accepted the revised law which listed, “51 serious and incurable diseases that 
would cause the mother, the fetus or the future child to suffer as acceptable conditions for 
abortion to be performed.”142  
Women in these cases are forced to decide between keeping and raising a child with 
thalassemia or choose to have an unsafe and illegal abortion. “An associated harm is the 
disempowerment of women in the process of reproduction. Women are faced with the choice of 
exposing their own bodies to harm or exposing their child to suffering in the future if the 
pregnancy continues to term.”143 Choosing illegal abortions without the funds for aftercare 
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Psychological consequences of illegal abortion among the women of Tehran were 
significant and considerably neglected. Outcomes included typical responses such as smoking, 
drug abuse, and eating disorders as well as depression, attempted suicide, guilt, regret, 
nightmares, decreased self-esteem, and anxiety about whether the operation left them infertile. 
Legal abortion on the other hand led to more positive outcomes. “Emotional problems resulting 
from abortion are rare and less frequent than those following childbirth.”144 
During the one year period from August 2011 until August 2012, interviews were 
conducted in the Women’s Office of the Iranian Legal Medicine Organization in Tehran. Women 
were interviewed during the process of their application for abortion. Under the law, women 
were required to be approved by three specialists and obtain office approval, having proven one 
of the 51 legal conditions needed for a license. In total 1,378 applied for a license and 661 were 
issued. Of those who made a claim, 1,110 checked fetal indications and 268 for maternal 
indications, as the reason for the application.145 The numbers seemed incongruous with the law. 
Over one thousand fetal claims were made however, only 596 were approved. The data broke 
down the fetal claims into categories and presented the breakdown for each. There were many 
fetal categories which contained varying amounts of both approved and denied claims. However, 
there were ten categories comprised of 225 fetal claims which were entirely denied. The ten 
categories were: “eye anomalies, mother’s own medication regime, mother’s diagnosed with a 
disease that could cause fetal abnormalities, mother’s exposure to radiation, positive screening 
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test results for fetal anomalies, partial moles, amniotic fluid disorder, intrauterine growth 
restriction, and intrauterine fetal death.”146 There were a total of five intrauterine fetal deaths 
which were produced as a reason for a license. None were approved. The data collected from the 
interviews indicated that the most common reason for not granting a license was due to a 
gestational age over 19 weeks, the cutoff before ensoulment. This forced the mother into an 
unhealthy and unsafe position, regardless of her choice. She could not carry a non-viable fetus. 
This is an example of the strict interpretation of theocratic law failing to address the reality of 
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CONSEQUENCES OF RESISTANCE 
 
STATE IMPOSITIONS & MUNDANE ACTIVITIES 
 While President Khatami sought to implement progressive changes, the spiritual ruler of 
the country, Ayatollah Khamenei, (Khomeini’s successor) pursued reforms which tightened state 
and religious control over the lives of Iranian citizens.147 Many of the Post Islamist feminists 
acknowledged a form of gilded age of women’s reforms. New interpretations of Islamic texts 
changed facets of women’s lives, but harsh inequalities remained. Women were successful at 
clawing their way into public spaces, but problems remained concerning issues such as, 
“women’s right to divorce, child custody, polygamy, and sexual submission, and the amount of a 
man’s blood money was still twice that of woman’s.”148 The women’s movement was atypical. 
There were no clear leaders of the movement and the few activists that were participating were 
few and far between. Their efforts were fragmented and many of their forms of resistance were 
passive, although they were creating space for themselves. The strength of the movement resided 
in the coordinated membership of ordinary daily activities which served as munitions in the 
battle for equality. 
 Sociologist Asef Bayat defined their efforts as a nonmovement, where activists resisted 
through action and discourse. Upon examination it was the collective acts of defiance that 
defined the movement, regardless if they did not meet certain qualifiers such as illegal or 
individualistic, defensive or hidden. “Rather, they were also collective and progressively 
encroaching, in the sense that actors would capture trenches from the patriarchal legal structure, 
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public institutions, and family to move forward, so that each gain would act as a stepping-stone 
for a further claim.”149 Feminists asserted their identity and created space which they carved out 
in controlled public spaces. Women had developed passive networks which constructed identities 
for the whole population of women. “Passive networks signified instantaneous and unspoken 
communication between atomized individuals established through gaze in public space by tacit 
recognition of commonalities expressed in style, behavior, or concerns.”150 Women knew all 
about the struggles that they faced on a daily basis and had faced since the day they were born. It 
never needed to be articulated and explained. They are and always have been aware of the 
oppression that exists in their lives. This silent opposition was effective because it was 
perpetually enacted in the mundane practices of everyday life. Women understood that a more 
confrontational role would mean that they were prime targets for backlash from the state, society, 
and family. “This nonmovement operated through an incremental and structural process of claim 
making – similar to “quiet encroachment,” but intimately attached to the imperative of women’s 
persistent public presence.”151 The power they displayed seemed ordinary but allowed them to 
claw out space over time.  
 Access to public spaces and positions necessarily provided women with excuses for 
further access. Women took what they could within the framework of Iranian Islamic society and 
worked from these negotiated spaces to stake claims and move forward. By building larger 
coalitions of women, their movement placed itself in the larger global effort for women’s rights, 
because they recognized that their rights were human rights, staking claim to their sought 
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humanity. Over time, their collective actions evolved and were used at opportune times to 
selectively mobilize great numbers of social actors at rallies and protests. They utilized their 
electronic voices via social media platforms which transcended the constraints imposed by an 
oppressive regime. The efforts of Iranian feminists are elusive and adaptable, and they position 
women to reclaim stakes stolen by despotic actions of the state.152 
REPERCUSSIONS OF RESISTANCE: STI’S & HIV 
There were negative implications for this sexual revolution as well, including both the 
mental and physical health of these youth. It resulted in changes in social behaviors which 
produced much higher incidences of sexually transmitted infections and the human 
immunodeficiency virus, even among straight females. There was a rise in the number of 
abortions and unwanted pregnancies and hymenoplasties during the sexual revolution in the early 
2000’s. This was due to the Islamic Republic’s strict ban on premarital sex. As a result, sexual 
education programs did not address the risks outside of a framework for married couples. Due to 
the lack of information and the imposing social and religious threat of shaming, “many women 
were more afraid of the social risks of sexual activity (being seen or getting caught by the 
Islamic morality police or family members) than the health risks of diseases such as HIV.”153 
Recent reviews of women’s health in Iran have shown some alarming trends. Leading into 2016, 
female rates of HIV were predicted to increase by 546 percent. Men’s rates of HIV over the same 
period were predicted to increase by 60 percent. Neither statistic is good, but clearly, the female 
population of Iran is in great jeopardy with incidences as high as 4.5 percent of the population. 
Likewise, the rates of genital ulcers were ten times higher in women than in men during the same 
 
152 Ibid., 114. 
 





 By participating in the sexual revolution, women were inadvertently taking part in 
political resistance, by refusing to be shackled by the patriarchal valuation of virginity. This 
effort to reclaim their bodies resulted in the accidental benefit of resisting the government and 
the restrictive culture created by the dominant religious and traditional discourses imposed on 
women, where socioreligious values became codified into law. There were many reasons for 
youth to participate in sexual activity including love and romance. One study showed that young 
Iranian “males were more driven by pleasure, recreation, peer pressure and impulsivity than 
young Iranian females. While women, were driven more by their need of support and physical 
care.”155  The study also showed that 42 percent of women and 28 percent of men in the study 
regretted their sexual relationships. The different levels of regret were attributed to the different 
levels of sexual permissiveness in the conservative social arena.   
THE VALUE OF A LIFE 
Iranian women who were married to non-Iranian men still could not pass on their 
nationality to their children, but Iranian men married to non-Iranian women were able to do so. 
In 2014, the Iranian Parliament banned permanent forms of contraception to boost the birthrate, 
in yet another display of state power invading women’s control over their bodies. The decree was 
issued to “strengthen national identity and counter undesirable aspects of Western lifestyles.”156 
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Even seemingly positive news revealed a patriarchal underbelly which remained handcuffed to 
an oppressive culture.  
Diya, or blood money was a predetermined financial compensation paid to the family of 
persons who was killed or to a person who was injured. The person responsible for the death or 
injury paid the penalty. In July 2019, the state-run Fars News Agency reported on a new law 
declaring blood money would now be equal for a man and woman. Previously, the compensation 
amounts stated that the blood money paid for a woman would only be half that of a man. This 
seemed like a progressive step forward however, upon further investigation, the law did no such 
thing. Instead, the guilty perpetrator would still be required to pay the same amount for 
murdering a woman, only half that of a man’s diya. The Supreme Court of Iran determined that 
the difference would be paid to the victim from a special publicly funded trust controlled by the 
state. “In its ruling, the Supreme Court judges essentially devised a way to circumvent a grossly 
discriminatory law without triggering opposition from the conservative Guardian Council.”157 
Furthermore, when murderers could not afford to pay the diya, they would sit in jail until they 
could come up with the money, which may have been years. The ruling perpetuated the idea that 
killing a woman would only cost half as much as taking the life of a man, making them seem 
more dispensable. 
These rulings supported a long history of undervaluing women’s lives through legal 
means based on Islamic and traditional interpretations. Noted Iranian criminologist, Dr. Shala 
Moazami interviewed 220 killers who were in jail and found the reason each gender murdered 
their spouses were vastly different. “Men kill out of jealousy; the women want to get out of the 
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marriage.”158 This was very revealing since Iranian law stated that a man would not have been 
punished for killing his wife if he caught her with another man. Those men would not have been 
in jail unless they could not meet the burden of proof, which is that four men must have 
witnessed it. This may have seemed arbitrary however, there was no stipulation for evidence 
when a woman caught her husband with another woman. The only recourse for women would 
have been to ask a judge for a divorce.  
Another valid reason a woman had for a divorce would have been if she could provide 
statements from a doctor that her husband had beat her violently. The process could have taken 
up to five years before the divorce was granted and the judge and the police would have returned 
the woman to her husband in the meantime. In addition, even if violence against the husband 
were proved by a doctor’s written testimony, there was no legal recourse for the woman against 
the husband. He could not have had charges brought against him.  This disparity in the law was 
pervasive and punitive, creating obstacles for women who continued to fight for equal rights.  
In an interview with the Director of the Wilson Center’s Middle East Program, Haleh 
Esfandiari spoke about a confrontation with the Iranian government in 2007. During a trip to 
Tehran to see her mother, she was stopped and robbed of her passport, trapping her in Iran 
without a way to return home. Iranian intelligence agents interrogated her for six weeks and 
eventually took her to Evin Prison, accusing her of attempting to overturn the government. She 
spoke of her 105 days in solitary confinement and her interrogations. She stated that it was 
difficult to get the agents to understand that she held her position as Director, even though she 
was an Iranian-American woman, because the mentality in America was so different. America is 
 
 





filled with diverse people of all backgrounds from all over the world. It is a nation of 
immigrants. In Iran, Shi’ites have special access to certain positions in society. “So, in a country 
where opportunity is open mostly to one sect, it’s hard to explain that employers never ask your 
religion or your background. It’s your merit that counts.”159 The agents seemed very suspicious 
of scholarly programs and the exchange of academic knowledge. They believed that everyone 
was working to undermine the Iranian government and replace it with the goals of the United 
States government. It was in these interrogations that she first heard the term, “velvet 
revolution”. Ultimately, they explained that it referred to the West’s efforts to implement a 
regime change by fomenting a revolution through the spread of knowledge and by empowering 
women. They viewed the Wilson Center as a vehicle to gather like-minded people to start a 
revolution.160 Iran’s mentality was that they were under siege by the United States and its 
Western allies in Turkey and NATO. The empowerment of intelligent women in positions of 
power represented an assault on the Islamic Republic of Iran. 161 
Tying political attacks to the empowerment of women seemed illogical, however the 
patriarchal reinforcement in Iranian society helped put it into context. Shahram Khosravi 
revealed in his book Precarious Lives, that the education of women transformed many societal 
norms and nurtured the idea that men were being robbed of their power. As more women sought 
education, it resulted in more female migration in search of schools to attend. This disrupted the 
male practice of choosing their spouse. Consequently, members of the Guardian Council 
villainized female education, stating that it led to the desire for employment and damages to the 
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family.162 It was believed that women were the reason for men’s unemployment as they were 
stealing their jobs. This imbalance, authorities claimed would result in a social crisis. Having 
women in public spaces cultivated apprehensions about masculine identities. “In the shadow of 
modern women…men are no longer the men they were. They have almost been transformed into 
a third gender, floating between manhood and womanhood… [Men are] marginalized and 
submissive.”163 These examples of Iranian machismo fragility were part of the pushback in 
patriarchal culture, a certain kind of femophobia. 
This normalization of sexism attempted to upend feminist efforts. It intended to disprove 
the notion that women were victims of patriarchy by recasting them as aggressors and 
emasculators. Khosravi explained the notion of zanzalil, “(literally, being subjugated and 
humbled by a woman),”164 He went on to say that men in Iran used the term to tease other men 
and to humiliate women. Essentially, the term denoted connotations of men as “sissies” and 
someone who was “whipped” relegating them to non-dominant positions in their relationship. 
The term was prevalent in popular culture and jokes. There have even been researched books on 
the notion of zanzalil. One sociologist at Tehran University published a book, reinforcing the 
stereotypes and demonizing women. The sociologist, “rejects the idea that Iranian families are 
patriarchal, claiming instead that a majority of Iranian wives are authoritarian. The author states 
that the destabilization of families in Iran is due to the imbalance in power relations between 
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authoritarian wives and zanzalil husbands.”165 Terms and notions such as zanzalil reinforced 
patriarchal structures dismissing feminist objections to paint women as monsters and feminine 
men as impotent daisies.  
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE STATE: DEMOCRACY & DESPOTISM 
 In 1963, Mohammad Reza Shah instituted the White Revolution, a series of reforms 
meant to drag Iran out of the backwardness it occupied and into the modern world. The 
unintended consequences of industrialization forced people into urban areas, resulting in poverty 
and chaos. One of the socioeconomic reforms centered on a redistribution of land. Religious 
conservatives fiercely opposed the land reform because they owned large tracts of land due to 
religious endowments. This threatened to erode part of their economic power base. The ulama 
realized they were fighting a losing battle because the land reform had massive popular 
support.166 They decided to attack a different component of the reform which extended political 
rights to women, giving them the right to vote. Their actions resulted in the exile of the most 
outspoken opponent, the young Ayatollah Khomeini.167  
 The attempt to use women as a weapon to preserve power during the Pahlavi Monarchy 
illuminated the third chimeric space in which women have had to place themselves. As Homa 
Hoodfar and Shadi Sadr, pointed out in 2010, none of the conservative leaders who have 
ascended to political power have accepted the “primacy of democracy nor the premise of 
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contrary to their reading of divine scripture.”168 Women sought to find reinterpretations of 
Islamic texts which promoted more liberal views of democracy and equality. Many were 
suggested but few materialized into progressive changes. Women made innovative arguments 
and found intellectuals who provided the proper Islamic framework, which helped women to 
minimize the gap between Islamic and secular perspectives. In theory, the propositions should 
have become laws, especially since many had widespread popular support. They did not become 
laws. Instead, the Supreme Leader imposed his specific fundamentalist understanding of Shari’a 
to relegate any alternative readings to a subaltern position beneath the radical Islamic vision.169  
 Initially, women battled for space from between modernity and Islamic morality. Then 
they sought to reinterpret the texts to continue fighting for women’s rights from a space between 
Iranian democratic nationalism and fundamentalist Shari’a. Next, because radical conservatives 
refused to relinquish any power and chose to countermand even legitimate gender laws which 
have been passed by the Majles and verified by liberal clerics, women found themselves working 
from a new space, fighting from between the democratic will of the people and the despotic 
imposition of a singular radical fundamentalist Shari’a. It was from here that women created 
space in the last decade. 
 In Iran, the larger obstacle to gender equality had more to do with the undemocratic 
relationship between the state and the society and less to do with the actual or potential 
compatibility (or lack, thereof) legitimate religious interpretations. The problem was not that 
Islamic texts were used as guidelines for all the laws. The problem was that the structure of the 
state governmental systems was ultimately despotic and answerable to no one. Iran had what 
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appeared to be a democracy because the Supreme Leader allowed it to appear that way. “Political 
players representing diverse social, political, and gender visions were in competition for access 
to power and resources, culminating in the creation of a dualistic state structure in which non-
elected and non-accountable state authorities and institutions were able to oversee the elected 
ones.”170 Because there was a singular pursuit of a specific interpretation without regard for 
alternative legitimate and valid interpretations of Shari’a law, the Supreme Leader was able to 
use the state structure as a tool to maintain the power to despotically impose his radical 
conservative understanding on the people of Iran. 
 The Supreme Leader controlled the Guardian Council who, through no power granted to 
them in the Constitution, oversaw the approval of all political candidates. “This exercise of 
control over who may participate in elections by an unaccountable council has resulted in 
intolerance of any dissent, regardless of whether it is secular or operating from within a religious 
framework (as in the case of many reformists).”171 When any reformists were disqualified for 
operating within an Islamic Shi’a framework, just because it was divergent from the radical 
vision of the Supreme Leader, it flew in the face of a Shi’a tradition which respected a “diversity 
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CHAPTER V  
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: RESISTANCES AND REPRISALS 
 
While interviewing Mahnaz Afkhami, Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani noted the method of 
implementing changes in women’s lives benefitted from the acceptance of small changes and 
reforms as victories, instead of requiring the ideal as an all or nothing proposition. “We can 
move forward better and eventually accomplish more by welcoming small reforms, get them 
implemented, and then demand more.”173 The people who continued to oppose women’s 
reforms, she thought, did so because they questioned the legitimacy of the regime, so they 
perpetually set themselves in opposition of any progress it might make. As a result, the efforts to 
create space for women’s political voices were either discarded out of hand or, provisionally 
stalled. 
Marjane Satrapi the author of Persepolis, the groundbreaking autobiographical graphic 
novel was interviewed by Emma Watson for Vogue magazine. She was asked if life was any 
easier for women compared to her childhood, which took place during the Revolutionary period 
in Iran. She stressed the importance of feminist gains in education, concluding that girls were 
getting married today who were more educated than their husbands. This she declared was the 
way for women to defiantly challenge the notion that women are worth half of men. Education 
was the key which could unlock economic independence which in turn would liberate the 
populace and secure true democracy. “The enemy of democracy is patriarchal culture. As with 
the family, where the father of the family decides and has the last word, so a dictator is the father 
of the nation.”174 
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In their book, Persuasive Acts, Shari J. Stenberg and Charlotte Hogg dedicate a chapter to 
Shirin Ebadi. Ms. Ebadi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2003 for her efforts to promote 
civil rights and democracy for women and children in Iran.175 She was the first woman and first 
Iranian to receive the award. Before the Revolution, she had been a judge, but Khomeini’s 
reforms removed all women from the bench, and she was forced to resign. She taught at the 
University of Tehran for 13 years while she awaited the renewal of her law license. It was 
refused until 1992. Her efforts for women and children began when she got her law practice 
back. During her activist years, prior to 2003, she helped mentor many young activists. In an 
excerpt from her own memoir, Until We Are Free, she talks about meetings she had with 
Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani and Parvin Ardalan during the planning phases of their One Million 
Signatures Campaign. 176 
 After her Nobel Prize award, the Islamic state worked even harder to silence her voice. In 
2005, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s paramilitary forces ramped up their pressure. They 
bugged her law offices, stopped her lectures, and detained her daughter. They used vans of 
trained policewomen dressed from head to toe in black chadors to shut down peaceful assemblies 
with tear gas, violence, and intimidation. In one instance in 2006, many women were arrested 
and charged with disturbing public order, fostering tension and unrest, and spreading lies.177 The 
Islamic Constitution of Iran, “upholds people’s right to free assembly and public demonstration, 
on the condition that no weapons are carried and the principles and tenets of Islam are not 
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undermined. The women had only been carrying their handbags and a pamphlet titled, Why We 
Don’t Consider the Present Laws Just. The crackdown was meant to crush the spirits of the 
activists and frighten them into compliance. Instead women’s organizations needed to pivot to 
find a space from which to confront a despotic regime which acted outside of the Constitution it 
had written.  
 During her meetings with Khorasani and Ardalan, she advised them to encourage women 
to work as a collective to affect change. She wanted them to pursue avenues of inclusivity, 
“including traditional religious people as well as secularists, demonstrating the importance of 
forming an inclusive collective.”178 She wanted women to go door to door and to move the 
conversation in a national one. She recognized the membership of the Iranian feminist movement 
in the global fight for women’s rights. Regardless of the harassment from the police, women’s 
resistance started to bear fruit. They started to build grassroots supports from women of all 
backgrounds. The young activists were inspired by Ms. Ebadi’s Nobel Prize award. It proved to 
them that the world was taking notice of their efforts. They launched their One Million 
Signatures campaign to protest legal discriminations against women. Their goal, Ebadi advised, 
should be to reform all discriminatory laws. When they asked her if such a goal would even be 
possible under a system like the one in the Islamic Republic of Iran, she responded. “This must 
be the aspiration, the Ideal. An ideal is like the sun in the sky. Perhaps no one can ever reach the 
sun, but you shouldn’t forget that it’s there.”179 
 The campaign has gone on to create a wider debate about discriminatory laws. It has been 
an effective vehicle to speak to people and emphasize the peacefulness of the movement to 
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prevent the government from creating an alternative narrative. Even when the arrests of some of 
the women began and their handbooks were investigated for contraventions against Islam, there 
was nothing to be found. Ms. Ebadi and her lawyerly skills made it impossible for the state to 
declare the activists apostates.180 “The social aspect is key here, because the feminist activists 
managed to disentangle the women’s question from the high politics of East versus West, Iran 
versus the world, and the Islamic Republic versus democracy.”181 Women were able to find the 
chimeric space between the ideologies and continue using it to stake new claims as they targeted 
the state structure and the imposition of discriminatory fundamentalist readings of Islamic texts. 
In 2016, President Rouhani openly criticized the use of 7,000 undercover people whose 
job it was to take pictures and report to the morality police in Tehran. His opposition of this 
practice was a direct refutation of the policy set forth by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. 
Many of Rouhani’s attempts to relax social rules have been met by Islamic hardliners who wish 
to stop the “infiltration of Western culture. They harshly criticized Rouhani last year for saying 
the police should enforce the law rather than Islam.”182  
This wasn’t the first time Rouhani was at odds with the Supreme Leader concerning 
gender equality. Khamenei has a long history of accusing the West of being mistaken when it 
comes to gender equality.183 In his mind, males and females have different purposes and different 
jobs. They are not interchangeable and should not be thought of as one entangled entity called a 
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human being. Women he argued, belong in the domestic arena and provide peace in the home. 
Having a paying job outside of the home would make it impossible for her to have the peace of 
mind necessary to fulfill her purpose. “If the woman herself does not have mental and spiritual 
peace, she cannot give this peace to the family. A woman who is humiliated, who is insulted, 
who has pressure of work, cannot be a housewife, cannot be the manager of the house.”184 
Rouhani, the current President of Iran, is not thought of as a reformist. Had that been the 
case, the Supreme Leader would not have approved of or allowed his candidacy. And while he 
has not taken many significant actions in defiance of the Supreme Leader, he has spoken out on 
the issue. “This talk is true that the home is the foundation for society and reform begins in the 
home, but if we ignore half of the population of the country, we will not see real development 
and growth in that country. Those who are scared of women’s presence and excellence, or have 
other views, to please not attribute these wrong views  religion, Islam, and the Quran.”185 This 
seems to signify that the issues of gender discrimination which exist in law in Iran have no basis 
in Islam, presumably because various interpretations of Islam allow for more equality. Instead, 
President Rouhani seems to be pointing the finger at the ultimate presider and decider of law in 
Iran, the Supreme Leader, which he attributes with wrong views. Bakhshizadeh notes, “all 
arrangements of political structure are aimed at maintaining the power and ultimate authority of 
conservative policy.”186 
In 2017, there was excitement as the Police Chief in Tehran stated that women would no 
longer be arrested for not wearing a hijab in the city. Compulsory hijab had been the law since 
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the 1979 Iranian Revolution. He stated that women would no longer be taken to detention centers 
or have a judicial case filed against them. Normally, the morality police would arrest women 
who wore brightly colored headscarves or coverings where too much hair was visible. Activists 
were reluctant to celebrate because they noted the very carefully worded statement which 
indicated that if their scarves “accidentally” fell off, then women would be sent to “education 
centers”. They also pointed out that, “on the same day the relaxed response to dress code 
violations was announced, a young woman taking part in the #WhiteWednesdays campaign 
against compulsory hijab,” an online movement that was started by the female Iranian-born 
journalist, Masih Alinejad, “was arrested.”187 This give and take is representative of the political 
gamesmanship between a regime that is intent on controlling women’s bodies and women who 
are resisting in a myriad of covert methods on a daily basis, trying to have their voices heard. 
The Amnesty International report on Iran from 2017/2018 was disheartening. They 
summarized: 
“The authorities heavily suppressed the rights to freedom of expression, 
association and peaceful assembly, as well as freedom of religion and belief, and 
imprisoned scores of individuals who voiced dissent. Trials were systematically 
unfair. Torture and other ill-treatment was widespread and committed with 
impunity. Floggings, amputations and other cruel punishments were carried out. 
The authorities endorsed pervasive discrimination and violence based on gender, 
political opinion, religious belief, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation and 
gender identity. Hundreds of people were executed, some in public, and thousands 
remained on death row. They included people who were under the age of 18 at the 
time of the crime.” 
 
They continue by stating that women are “entrenched” in discrimination, including violence, 
forced marriages, and other violations, including the arrest and imprisonment of women 
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activists who attended women’s empowerment workshops.188 
 Amnesty International also warned that an Iranian women’s rights activist and medical 
doctor, Farhad Meysami who was jailed was in extremely poor health due to a hunger strike. He 
was arrested for protesting compulsory hijab laws in July of 2018. In August, he started his 
hunger strike and was in very frail condition.189 On November 27th, Nasrin Sotoudeh, a female 
Iranian rights activist who was also a political prisoner, started her own hunger strike to protest 
the deteriorating health of Meysami. She was demanding his release.190 On November 30th, 122 
days after Meysami began his hunger strike, “a group of United Nations human rights experts 
issued a statement urging Iran to guarantee the rights of activists who have been put in prison 
for supporting protests against the mandatory hijab.”191 They urged the government to release 
the political prisoners who were jailed for protecting the rights of women. 
 In an August 2018 interview, Masih Alinejad, the activist, author, and founder of My 
Stealthy Freedom, who started the #WhiteWednesdays initiative responded to Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo’s mention of her campaign. She clarified that the movement is a peaceful 
demonstration where women hit the streets to remove their veils in protest of compulsory hijab 
laws. She stated the Republic of Iran took women’s bodies hostage. “We are not fighting 
against a piece of cloth. We are actually challenging the foundational block of the Islamic 
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Republic of Iran. We are challenging the main pillar of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”192 This 
she explained, was the reason for the government to sentence a #WhiteWednesdays activist to 
20 years in prison. It was a way for them to strike fear into women. They intended to put a stop 
to any protests targeting the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
 After being asked why she described herself as a product of the Revolution, Alinejad 
responded that her parents only supported it because they were poor and they were hoping for a 
better life, but it never materialized. Instead, she countered, the Revolution was against women 
and Iranian people. To try and deliver on the opportunity for a better life for her parents, she 
started a revolution of her own in her family’s own kitchen.193 After the Revolution, women lost 
all the social freedom that they already had. Gone were the female singers, the ability to enter 
sports stadiums, to play sports, to be judges, and to have the freedom to choose what they 
wanted to wear. She started a revolution of her own because people like her parents have not 
found a better life and they are suffering from a corrupt and cruel government. 
 Rena Ninen, the interviewer, asked her about a quote from her new book where she 
stated that the Revolution was a step backward for women and that being a woman born in Iran 
was like having a disability. Alinejad responded by explaining the attitude that the government 
has toward women which regards them as half of a man in legal circles, relegating women to 
second class status. Their rules often required the permission of their husbands, including 
traveling abroad and enrolling in school. Fortunately, Alinejad saw the promise of a new future 
for women in Iran, illustrating the activist fire that drives her campaign. “Women, right now, 
are breaking the law every day to challenge their regime, to show them that we are not disabled, 
 






and we are not going to be victims. We are the victorious. We are the warriors and we are 
pushing back the boundaries every day.”194 The veil was a revolutionary symbol which made it 
impossible to ignore women as political agents. By keeping the veil issue at the forefront of 
popular consciousness women cemented their hold on the foundation of political space that they 
continued to build upon.195  
 In January 2019, Iranian activist Shaparak Shajarizadeh was interviewed by Celine 
Cooper for OpenCanada.org. Named one of the 100 inspiring and influential women of 2018 by 
the BBC, she joined the fight against compulsory hijab working with #WhiteWednesdays and 
#TheGirlsofRevolutionStreet. In the interview, Shajarizadeh expressed the opinion that women 
did not have a lot of rights in Iran. When asked about the hijab, she corrected those who claimed 
the veil was a part of Iranian culture. “It is a sign of repression. It’s about violence. Iranian 
women always have this shadow of fear when we are out. You don’t feel safe.”196 She was 
arrested many times for her activism, with her husband, with her friend and her son, and on her 
own. After being interrogated and separated from her son after the police confiscated her car, 
phone, and money, in a city in the middle of the desert, she went on a hunger strike for nine 
days, as well as a water strike for three days. Eventually, she fled to Canada where she 
continues to be an activist fighting against compulsory hijab. She remembers the empowerment 
she felt when she first joined the #WhiteWednesdays initiative. “I felt very powerful. I’m a 
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little. They pushed and we pushed. We’re not going to step back now. We want our rights.”197 
 The Girls of Revolution Street are rooted in the #WhiteWednesdays movement which 
was started by Masih Alinejad. Together they have worked to bring women’s issues to the 
forefront. By implementing modern strategies, they have been able to stay one step ahead of the 
oppressive methods to control and silence their messages. Alinejad’s efforts started with a 
Facebook page titled, My Stealthy Freedom, which garnered half a million “likes” in the first 
month. It launched a campaign igniting the hashtag, #WhiteWednesdays, which encouraged 
women to wear white hijabs on Wednesdays to bring attention to the protest of mandatory hijab 
laws. Vida Movahed participating in the #WhiteWednesdays campaign appeared in viral videos 
of her standing atop a utility box as she removed her white hijab waving it in the air. Soon the 
#GirlsofRevolutionStreet hashtag started trending all over the world as women found their way 
to the same utility box to video themselves waving their own headscarves. “Alinejad has hosted 
a weekly show on Voice of America (VOA) television, and her campaign engages on multiple 
social media apps, where some of the photos and videos draw millions of views and thousands 
of comments.”198 When a driver refused to transport a Tehrani woman because she was wearing 
her hijab incorrectly, the organizations protested by boycotting the ride-share app.199 They have 
even employed new technologies which notify protest groups when police are nearby, allowing 
them to evade enforcement with one glance at their smartphone. By incorporating worldwide 
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message outside of the legal framework which preserves gender discrimination.  
 Women participating in these various forms of resistance have faced many obstacles and 
oppressions. They have been harassed and arrested. Many have fled the country to save their 
own lives and the lives of their family. By engaging in the modern movements, women have 
taken positions at the front lines in the battle for gender equality. And, while they are battered 
and wounded, they continue fighting from with the chimeric space they found for themselves. 
They have taken the examples left by the One Million Signature campaign about building large 
diverse coalitions but have found a way to do so while introducing a more confrontational and 
provocative message and style. “Their actions represent an implicit recognition that a new set of 
tools is needed to advance change in the Islamic Republic – that instead of working within the 
beleaguered rules of the game, it is time to contest the levers of power and the symbols that 
underpin the Islamic Republic’s claims to legitimacy.”200 
 Women continued to be targets of the current regime under President Hassan Rouhani 
and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Repression, intimidation, imprisonment and torture 
continued, but women would not have their voices silenced. “Today, seventeen women sit in 
parliament. In the current government, there are two women vice-presidents, one woman 
ambassador, four women governors of minor provinces and a handful of women mayors.”201 
Women faced challenges but continued to defiantly carve space out from the patriarchal 
impositions, occupied since time immemorial, which never rightfully belonged to men. They 
signed petitions for equality, facing prison terms. They organized in the streets, an ocean of 
women chanting for their votes be counted. They enrolled in education in much high numbers 
than men, and they purposefully and unabashedly constructed spaces by removing their veils in 
 




brazen protest. They push the boundaries of legal-social and religio-political state conventions. 
Social media and the internet have become their weapons, amplifying thunderous demands of 
justice.  
 Through it all, women never lost the ability to vote. They could not be judges, nor were 
they allowed to run for the Presidency. But, they were able to infiltrate the Majlis, in small 
numbers. At times, it seemed as though their voices were enough to break through and create 
permanent changes however, the Islamic Republic of Iran was more than a typical democracy. 
The President was merely one of the branches of governance which like the Majlis and the 
Iranian Supreme Court, were under the control of the Supreme Leader and the Guardian 
Council. And while the Guardian Council wielded great power, its twelve appointed members 
were selected from two groups. The first six were faqihs or experts in Islamic Law who were 
chosen by the Supreme Leader. The remaining six were elected by the Majlis, the Iranian 
Parliament, from among the Muslim jurists nominated by the Head of the Judiciary. On the 
surface, there seemed to be a balance of power, but the Head of the Judiciary was also the 
Supreme Leader. The chimeric space being pursued by women which promoted equality within 
the framework of Islamic Law, resided in the ability of women to shift conservative beliefs to 
more liberal understandings within the personal socio-religio-political interpretations of the 
Supreme Leader.  
 This battlefront for women between modernity and morality has been a perpetual 
contestation, a mixture of de facto and de jure patriarchy that counterpunches every gain in the 
struggle for space. The era of modernization in Iran witnessed the social visibility of women as 
they triumphed in creating significant reform. They earned the right to vote and developed a 
 




national family planning program. Unfortunately, their work became associated with the 
centralized monarchy of the Shah and suffered the brunt of the Revolution. As the Islamic 
Republic formed, women’s rights were undone and replaced with more discriminatory policies, 
unleashing patriarchal traditions from the domestic space into the public political space.  
Women were forced to fight their way out from under the imposition of a double 
barreled barrage of patriarchy in their private familial spaces, due to the dual identities which 
coexist in Iranian nationalism. The gendered nationalism which defines how the rules and roles 
of men and women are created, place women in subordinate spaces constructed by both the 
local historical traditions and conservative Islamic religious values. As women made inroads, 
creating space for their voices to be heard and confronting the imposition of law upon their 
bodies, they were able to join the sociopolitical discourses. They continued their push for access 
to education and resisted socioreligious tenets which governed life in public and private spaces, 
carving out foundations in an era of increased openness and discourse.  
Backlash followed again as Islamic hard-liners increased hostilities and repressed 
women’s organizations leaving the Republic choked by sanctions. Activism was met by a brutal 
alliance of the military and the clerics, but the movement has reached out seeking new strategies 
from women’s groups around the world. By working together and utilizing new technologies, 
Iranian gender activists fought through the state’s efforts to keep them isolated from the global 
movement. “Women are becoming increasingly more informed of the current trends within 
global feminisms and more transnationally engaged, especially with regard to the mechanisms, 




CEDAW.”202 Global influence also resulted in the punishment of women as they participated in 
common activities learned through social media platforms. The state imposed vindictive 
penalties for ambiguous law violations for the appearance of potential improprieties. Women 
continued to resist through active and passive measures in pursuit of both equal and equitable 
treatment in public and private spaces.  
Initially, the challenge existed in the fact that the Islamic State could never legitimately 
veer from valid interpretations of the holy texts and the women living in Iran could never 
relinquish their rights as human beings, constantly seeking the spaces to make their voices heard 
in the pursuit of equality. The necessity of women to carve out and occupy a chimeric 
paradoxical space, which zealously pursued modern women’s rights within the framework of 
Islamic ideological interpretation, left few terminal solutions. The fight for women’s rights 
subsisted in a space that evolved with Iranian state structures, inhabiting the location between 
two identities which could never coalesce. The state was steadfast and had traditional customs 
veiled in religious doctrine on their side but continued to need public approval to continue 
governing in a democracy. Once achieved the movement faced the harsh reality that their 
democracy meant little under the absolute dominion of a despotic ruler sanctified by the divine.  
The women’s movement struggles to fight for their rights but continues to work within 
the framework of Islamic ideals. The limitations of new interpretations are determined by a 
Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council who have demonstrated their willingness to 
supersede valid interpretations as well as the overwhelming voice of the people of Iran, in an 
effort to maintain their grasp on power, imposing their narrow interpretation of religious Islamic 
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texts by force and intimidation. The most promising outcome for women resides in their ability 
to be seen as a part of the larger international women’s movement, which may help to direct 
strategies using the influence of global membership and the pursuit of human rights, to liberate 
the firm grasp on religious interpretation currently being held hostage by the Supreme Leader of 
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